PACking a punch: Political Action Committees and corruption

Political Action Committees (PACs) are unique and prominent players in American politics. Yet, formal research on some aspects of PACs is lacking. Using US data over the period 1970 to 2009, this research demonstrates that the growth in PACs is positively associated with greater corruption. A 10% increase in the number of PACs per capita would increase corruption by about 8%. Upon disaggregation, corporate PACs, rather than labour PACs, are positively associated with corruption. The effects of economic prosperity, government size and population on US corruption are generally in line with the literature.     

Marketing Channel Choice and Marketing Efficiency Assessment in Agribusiness

In agribusiness, profitability critically depends on the choice of proper marketing channels. This article studies the factors influencing marketing channel choices of vegetable farmers. Vegetable farmers have generally 3 choices to sell their produce, which are formal and informal market participation vis-à-vis nonmarket participation. Ten independent variables are considered for the study and a multinomial logistic regression model is used for the analysis. The study finds 4 major variables that can influence farmers’ decision to shift from nonmarket participation to informal or formal market participation. The article further identifies 4 microlevel marketing channels and assesses their efficiency.     

Religion and Economic Activity in India: An Historical Perspective

A bstract . It is suggested that there has been and continues to be, a deep interrelationship between religious thought and economic activity in India. This claim is evaluated, first in the context of ancient India (the Mauryan empire ), where self-reliance was stressed, both economically and religiously, In the context of medieval India, the ossification of the once flexible caste system had profound economic implications. Based on this historical perspective, it is contended any attempt to understand the economic realities of contemporary India must also take account of its religious realities.     

The nexus of white collar crimes: shadow economy,corruption and uninsured motorists

This article empirically examines the nexus of three white collar crimes: shadow economy, corruption and uninsured motorists. Whereas the shadow economy–corruption linkage has been studied, the linkages with uninsured motorists have not been formally studied. Results, based on US data and accounting for possible bidirectional causalities, show complementarity between shadow economy and corruption and between uninsured motorists and the shadow economy. The magnitude of the impact of uninsured motorists on the shadow economy is greater than that of corruption. In other findings, shadow economy was lower in most prosperous states and in states that did not impose a sales tax.     

Driving Performance Through Corporate Culture: Interviews with Four Experts

Establishing an effective link between corporate strategy and employee performance has traditionally been seen as a function of organizational structure and internal marketing—that is, of getting the right compensation systems in place to reward the desired behavior, and relentlessly communicating the strategy to all employees. But, according to the four organizational behavior experts who were interviewed for this article, there's more to it than that. Also important is a market- and customer-oriented corporate culture, which can be a highly effective tool for companies seeking to improve performance and increase value.
This article presents four distinctive, but complementary views on why and how senior executives should play a significant role in managing the cultures within their organizations. According to these experts, it is possible to both transform and harness the power of a culture by paying greater attention to succession issues; articulating and communicating an organization's core values; aligning a company's behavioral norms with employee assumptions; and offering "constructive reconciliation of cultural differences." In the last analysis, a company's culture is said to be the most effective way for executives to ensure that their employees will perform "when no one is looking."     

Who instigates university–industry collaborations? University scientists versus firm employees

While evidence on the causes and effects of university–industry interaction is abundant, little is known about how, and particularly by whom, such interaction is instigated in the first place and subsequently managed. In this paper, we investigate which mode of collaboration (joint research, contract research, consulting, in-licensing, or informal contacts) is more likely to be initiated and managed by firm employees versus by university scientists. Moreover, we are interested in the differences between small and large firms to see whether initiation and management are affected by firm size. Using a sample of 833 German manufacturing firms, our results indicate that university scientists typically start collaborations with industry, while firm employees would take over the management of projects. Results vary markedly between small and large firms, with university scientists having somewhat higher difficulties initiating collaborations with large firms than with small firms.     

Does capital punishment deter white‐collar crimes?

This paper examines whether capital punishment, either directly or via a spillover effect, has a deterrent effect on white collar crimes. Using data on nearly 150 nations and various dimensions of capital punishment, including capital punishment for non‐violent crimes, we consider two widely prevalent white‐collar crimes—corruption and the shadow economy. Nesting the empirical analysis in the broader literature on determinants of corruption and the shadow economy, we find that capital punishment in general reduced both corruption and the shadow economy, and the deterrent effect on the shadow economy was relatively more prevalent. Adding some empirical insights to the theoretical arguments surrounding the desirability of maximal punishments, results show some trade‐off between the quantity and quality of punishment.     

Incomplete information as a deterrent to crime

This paper presents an incomplete information model, where a supervisor is entrusted with supervising a number of potential criminals of different types. The supervisor may not know the type of an individual criminal. We show how lack of complete information available to the law-enforcing agent may help to prevent crime at least to a limited extent by making rewards and penalties more effective.