THE GRAPE PHYLLOXERA PLAGUE AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT: THE UPKEEP OF VINEYARDS IN CATALONIA (SPAIN), 1858–1935

This paper analyses the impact in Catalonia of the grape Phylloxera plague in Europe (1865–90). A statistical model is used to analyse the economic resilience of 35 districts in Catalonia to this external ecological and economic shock, and to explain why districts in the provinces of Barcelona and Tarragona resumed growing wine grapes after the plague, in contrast to districts in Girona and Lleida provinces. The opportunity cost of labour, the demand pull of Barcelona's commercial growth, and the agro-climatic suitability of land for growing grapes are used to explain the differing capacities of districts to endure the Phylloxera plague in Catalonia.     

VALUE-AT-RISK AND CORPORATE VALUATION

Although first used mainly by financial institutions to evaluate their trading risks, Value-at-Risk (VAR) can also be used to enhance an industrial corporation's understanding and management of its market risks. To illustrate this broader application of VAR analysis, the authors present a simple example focusing on the valuation of a closely held company. In this case, VAR is used to analyze the sensitivity of the firm's value to movements in uncertain exchange rates, commodity prices, and interest rates.     

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND EMPLOYEE JOB SATISFACTION IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

The purpose of this study is to establish a measurement scale for human resource management (HRM) practices in nonprofit organizations and to analyze their impact on employee job satisfaction. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using a principal components was performed. The analyzed sample is composed of 62 organizations with 2,030 employees. The results demonstrate that 8 out of 20 analyzed variables determine the measurement scale of HRM practices in these organizations. These variables are related to psychological demands, active work and development possibilities, social relations and leadership, and the degree of coherence in the organization with its principles. According to the results, these practices have an impact on employee job satisfaction. We believe that these results are relevant due to the lack of similar studies and the relevance of nonprofit organizations as job creators in the European Union.     

Chinese Debate on Economic Reform: can China create a socialist market economy?

Between 1978 and 1992 a pattern of reform and tightening, inflation and deflation developed in China. The CPC realised that limiting central planning and expanding the role of the market had not alleviated the economic problems. In 1990–91 it was decided that the socialist core of China's economy should be restructured as a 'socialist market economy'. This article follows the Chinese debate on the content and structure of the reform process and its effects on China's economic institutions.     

Trust in Agency

Existing models of the principal–agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to work, the principal must trust the agent to work in the absence of incentives. I show that agency fosters the advent of intrinsic motivation and trustworthy behavior. Three distinct motivational schemes are analyzed: norms, ethical standards, and altruism. I identify conditions under which these mechanisms arise and show how they promote trust. The analysis alters several important predictions of conventional models: (1) Better outcomes may ensue in highly uncertain environments; (2) the principal is better off the more the agent is risk averse; and (3) larger equilibrium extrinsic incentives need not be associated with larger effort or larger total surplus .     

THE EFFECT OF PAYMENT DELAYS ON STOCK PRICES

In this paper stock returns are modeled as a function of payment delays. Three hypotheses are tested: (1) that buyers compensate sellers for a six-business-day payment delay; (2) that the rate of compensation is the riskless rate; and (3) that this delay is solely responsible for day-of-the-week effects. Results support the first and second hypotheses, but not the third. The coefficient on the variable that controls for payment delays is correctly signed and statistically significant. It is the correct size in all periods but one. However, the estimated rate of compensation probably differs across days of the week. Finally, controlling for a six-business-day payment delay fails to eliminate the weekly pricing pattern.     

Does the market provide sufficient employment protection?

We ask whether there is an efficiency rationale for public intervention in the form of an employment protection policy. Unlike most of the literature supporting current employment protection legislation we allow employers and workers to include severance payments in their private contracts. We focus attention on a model where firms learn over time about the value of the match. If future wage bargaining cannot be prevented, and even though severance payments may be part of the equilibrium contract, separations are too frequent (private employment protection is insufficient). Mandatory severance payments are not a remedy for this inefficiency. Instead, a Pigouvian tax/subsidy scheme will correct the inefficiency by enhancing employment protection.