Randal Heeb Innovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets

This paper studies vertical integration by an essential-good monopolist into complementary markets. Unlike previous studies of complementary products, consumers are allowed to purchase some components of a complementary basket, but not others. Two different pricing strategies by the integrated firm may emerge. In mass-market equilibria, the price of the complement under integration is zero and it is given away with the essential good. Niche-market equilibria have more conventional pricing. This dichotomy is consistent with consumer software pricing. Integration enhances consumer and total surplus, unless it leads to exit by the higher-quality rival, in which case welfare is reduced. Exit is most likely when it is least damaging to consumer welfare. Integration reduces innovation by the rival firm. The effect on innovation by the integrated firm is ambiguous, but numerical computation of an extended model indicates that integration increases the innovation of the integrated firm and enhances welfare.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

The End of the Federal Tobacco Program: Economic Impacts of the Deregulation of U.S. Tobacco Production

In 2004, Congress ended the sixty-six-year-old federal tobacco program, effectively deregulating production and prices. With deregulation came a buyout package, with cigarette manufacturers agreeing to pay more than $3 billion in present value to quota owners and farmers. While the dollar values of compensation payments are known, the effects of the historic legislation on tobacco markets are uncertain. We examine these effects and their welfare consequences. We also consider the appropriateness of the buyout payments under alternative views of economic damages due to the quota system's demise.     

The 1985 Ohio S&L Crisis: An Examination of S&L Stockholder Wealth Effects

This paper examines the savings and loan (S&L) equity market reaction to the 1985 Ohio S&L Crisis. In contrast to the expectation of negative abnormal returns associated with contagion, the authors find, during the crisis period, significant positive abnormal returns that are larger for a portfolio of less solvent S&Ls, and a significant decline in systematic risk. The results are consistent with an insurance subsidy hypothesis whereby news of the FSLIC's inadequacy in conjunction with the crisis signaled greater future reluctance by regulators to close large federally-insured S&Ls.