Rational choice and the taxation of sin

The traditional literature on sumptuary taxation indicates that these taxes are the results of a majority of individuals imposing their moral code upon consumers of goods that are thought to be undesirable. Undoubtedly, this explanation is not trivial, and accounts for the existence of some of the present sumptuary taxes. This paper has developed a choice model of sumptuary taxes based on a wealth-maximization assumption that illustrates the possibility that an individual could approve of an excise tax on a good that he consumes.     

More on money as a medium of exchange

Summary We extend the analysis of Kiyotaki and Wright, who study economies where the commodities that serve as media of exchange (or, commodity money) are determined endogenously. Kiyotaki and Wright consider only steady-state, pure-strategy equilibria; here we allow dynamic and mixed-strategy equilibria. We demonstrate that symmetric, steady-state equilibria in mixed-strategies always exist, while sometimes no such equilibria exist in pure-strategies. We prove that the number of symmetric steady-state equilibria is generically finite. We also show, however, that for some parameter values there exists a continuum of dynamic equilibria. Further, some equilibria display cycles.We thank the National Science Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for financial support, as well as seminar participants at Stanford University, the London School of Economics, the Econometric Society World Congress in Barcelona, and the Conference on Monetary Theory and Financial Institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for their comments or suggestions. Alberto Trejos provided research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources

Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity. These profit opportunities can be divided into two categories: productive, and predatory. Productive opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from enhancing the efficiency of government, while predatory opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from forcibly transferring resources from some to others. This analysis shows that political institutions tend to favor predatory over productive political entrepreneurship, and shows that what is sometimes referred to as political exchange does not have the same efficiency characteristics as voluntary exchange in private markets.     

《社区再投资法》和近期抵押贷款危机

美联储和其他联邦金融监管机构以<社区再投资法>为指导,在解决欠发达地区信贷需求方面已经积累了不少经验.<社区再投资法>鼓励金融机构面向低收入社区和居民,提供抵押贷款、小额贷款以及其他形式的信贷,而且还应向低收入地区和居民进行投资和提供服务,以此作为促进这些地区发展的总体努力的一部分.     

Exploring subcultural differences in hofstede's value survey: The case of the Chinese

Hofstede's Value Survey Module (VSM) identifies fundamental differences in the way people in various countries perceive and interpret their worlds. After adjusting value scores on the basis of demographic features of samples in the present study, values between subcultural groupings in four Chinese-populated regions (Taiwan, Beijing, Hong Kong, and Wuhan) were compared, and strong subcultural differences revealed. A methodology is proposed to facilitate VSM comparisons using limited, secondary data sources. Propositions concerning subcultural differences are suggested on the basis of the findings.     

Tactical Opportunities,Risk Attitude and Choice of Farming Strategy: an Application of the Distribution Method

When assessing farming strategies, it is important to account for the opportunities provided for tactically adjusting to outcomes of risk. The hypothesis that accounting for tactical adjustment is more important than accounting for risk attitude was supported in this study with regard to identifying the optimal drainage recirculation strategy for an irrigated dairy farm. Failing to account for tactical adjustment would lead to a sub-optimal choice, costing the farmer about A$3 100 in present value terms. In contrast, failing to account for risk aversion would not affect the strategy chosen. The distribution method was found to be well suited to modelling tactical adjustment.