NON-WELFARIST OPTIMAL TAXATION AND BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS

Abstract.  Research in behavioural economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions. In these situations, the government might want to intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to induce behaviour that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing. The analysis of such corrective interventions, through taxes and subsidies, might be called 'behavioural public economics'. However, such analysis, where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals, is not new in public economics. In these cases the government is said to be 'non-welfarist' in its objectives, and there is a long tradition of non-welfarist welfare economics, especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behaviour are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes. First of all the object of this paper is to present a unified view of the non-welfarist optimal taxation literature and, second, to present behavioural public economics as a natural special case of this general framework.     

Culture, management accounting and managerial performance: Focus Iran

Modern management and control systems may not be equally effective in every country. Budget participation is one of the effective tools in western nations. However, management control tools, in general, and budget participation, in particular, could be ineffective or even dysfunctional in other environments. Hofstede (1980) had suggested that cultural differences among countries are influencing factors. In this study, we investigate the impact of culture, budgetary participation, and management accounting systems on managerial performance in Iran. Three-way analyses of variance are used separately for each of the four cultural Hofstede dimensions. We find convincing evidence that the application of management tools and techniques developed in western countries for effective management performance is not as useful in the Iranian context.     

The structure of reseller goals and performance in marketing channels

The typical view of a marketing channel is that of a manufacturer-designed and-controlled distribution system. However, today, marketing functions, as well as market power, are more evenly distributed in the channel. In organizing and managing the modern channel, it is important to understand the business circumstances and priorities confronting channel members. This article studies how reseller firms establish their goal hierarchies and how these goals are related to performance. It hypothesizes that goal priorities emerge in relation to the environmental imperatives faced by the firm. The article develops hypotheses that are tested on survey data collected from a sample of franchisee firms, using structural equation models. The results support all the hypotheses about the effects of primary goals on performance. The effects of secondary goals are not unequivocal but informative nevertheless. Overall, the study points to interesting theoretical and managerial conclusions. Ravi S. Achrol (raachrol@mail.wvu.edu) (Ph.D., Northwestern University) is the Kmart Professor of Marketing in the College of Business & Economics at West Virginia University. Previously, he has served on the faculties of the George Washington University and the University of Notre Dame. His areas of research interest include distribution channels, marketing strategy, interorganizational relations, and network organization. His articles have appeared in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Public Policy and Marketing, theJournal of Retailing, Social Science Research, theJournal of Business Strategy, and various other publications. Michael J. Etzel (michael.j.etzel.1@nd.edu) (DBA, University of Colorado) is a professor of marketing at the University of Notre Dame. He has previously served on the faculties of the University of Kentucky and Utah State University. His areas of research include marketing management and strategy, retailing, and buyer behavior. In 1996–1997, he served as chair of the Board of the American Marketing Association. His research has appeared in a variety of publications, most notably theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Consumer Research, and theJournal of Retailing.     

Raising capital in emerging markets with restricted Global Depositary Receipts

Despite serious governance concerns revealed in Rule 144A and/or Regulation S Global Depositary Receipt (GDR) circulars, institutional investors voluntarily purchase these illiquid securities. Like issuers of Level III American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), GDR issuers exhibit strong pre-offer performance, with higher average Tobin's q ratios, sales growth rates, sales levels, returns on equity, and dividend payout ratios than their home-market counterparts. However, GDRs are issued predominantly by firms in emerging markets, while ADRs are issued mostly by firms in developed markets. After controlling for country and industry effects, we find that ADR issuers are larger and that they employ more reputable underwriters than GDR issuers do, but no other significant differences emerge. Notwithstanding their similarities, GDRs have larger discounts than ADRs, suggesting that legal bonding provides benefits that reputational bonding cannot fully replicate. However, within the sample of GDRs, pre-offer performance attributes also influence pricing. Specifically, discounts vary inversely with issue size but directly with firm size, suggesting that economies of scale exist in the GDR issue process and that potential agency costs are higher in larger firms. GDR discounts also vary inversely with incremental returns on equity in all partitions of the data, indicating the importance of pre-offer profitability in establishing the reputation of the issuing firm and in increasing the GDR offer price.     

Contracts, norms, and plural form governance

The organization of interfirm exchanges has become of critical importance in today’s business environment. Many scholars have criticized the inadequacies of legal contracts as mechanisms for governing exchange, especially in the face of uncertainty and dependence. Other scholars argue that it is not the contracts per se but the social contexts in which they are embedded that determine their effectiveness. This study investigates the performance implications of governance structures involving contractual agreements and relational social norms, individually and in combination (plural form) under varying conditions and forms of transactional uncertainty and relationship-specific adaptation. Hypotheses are developed and tested on a sample of 396 buyer-seller relationships. The results provide support for the plural form thesis—increasing the relational content of a governance structure containing contractual agreements enhances performance when transactional uncertainty is high, but not when it is low. Implications for theory and future research are discussed. Joseph P. Cannon (Ph.D., University of North Carolina) is an assistant professor of marketing at Colorado State University. His areas of research interest include the effective management of business-to-business buyer-seller relationships in domestic and international markets. His research has appeared in theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, theAcademy of Management Review, theJournal of Public Policy & Marketing, and other publications. He is a member of the Editorial Review Board of theJournal of Marketing. Ravi S. Achrol (Ph.D., Northwestern University) is a professor of marketing and global management research professor in the School of Business and Public Administration at George Washington University. Prior to joining George Washington University in 1991, he served for 10 years on the faculty of the University of Notre Dame. His areas of research interests include interorganization theory and marketing strategy. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, Social Science Research, theJournal of Business Strategy, theJournal of Public Policy and Marketing, and various other publications. He is a member of the Editorial Review Board of theJournal of Marketing. Gregory T. Gundlach (Ph.D. J.D. University of Tennessee) is an associate professor of marketing in the College of Business Administration at the University of Notre Dame. His areas of research interest include theories of exchange governance, industrial organization, and antitrust policy. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, Marketing Science, theJournal of Public Policy & Marketing, theJournal of Business Research, Antitrust Bulletin, and other publications. He is a member of the Editorial Review Board of theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Public Policy & Marketing, and theJournal of Retailing.     

Optimal taxation and public provision for poverty reduction

The existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes there exists a capacity to implement complex tax schemes, which is not necessarily the case for many developing countries. We examine the determinants of optimal redistributive policies in the context of a developing country that can only implement linear tax policies due to administrative reasons. Further, the reduction of poverty is typically the expressed goal of such countries, and this feature is also taken into account in our model. We derive the optimality conditions for linear income taxation, commodity taxation, and public provision of private and public goods for the poverty minimization case and compare the results to those derived under a general welfarist objective function. We also study the implications of informality on optimal redistributive policies for such countries. The exercise reveals non-trivial differences in optimal tax rules under the different assumptions.     

Unemployment,tariffs and the theory of international trade

In this paper, we introduce diminishing returns to scale in Brecher's model of international trade with unemployment and then investigate some issues embodied in the theory of international trade. Our principal results are that tariffs need not improve a country's terms of trade and that capital accumulation also need not result in a predictable change in the terms of trade.