Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Liquidity, Labels and Medium-Term Notes

We suggest that the medium-term note market provides an excellent laboratory for exploring the relationships between yield, liquidity, and the label affixed to a financial instrument. Crabbe and Turner (1995) examined the liquidity issue and uncovered the counter-intuitive result that issue size is unrelated to liquidity. Their study failed to examine a potential channel for a liquidity effect, however, in the form of multiple issues from a single, typically large, MTN registration filing. We find evidence that file size is significantly related to yield in a number of instances. Several other proxies for liquidity, such as frequency of issue, are also sometimes significantly related to yields. Contrary to Crabbe and Turner (1995) , we find that labeling a security an MTN can have an impact on its yield. The label "note" also appears to matter for yield in some instances.     

Long- and short-term interest rates in 19 countries: Tests of cointegration and parameter instability

This paper examines the long-run relationship between short-term and long-term interest rates (both nominal and real) in 19 countries, and explores the possibility that the relationship is statistically stable using Lc, MeanF, and SupF statistics suggested by Hansen [1992]. Empirical results obtained from various cointegration techniques (Johansen, Phillips and Hansen, Stock and Watson, and Park) and quarterly data (1973–1998) show considerable support for the expectations hypothesis in all countries (except the United Kingdom). In a majority of cases, it is also found that a stable relationship exists between the short-term and long-term interest rates.     

Endogenous Group Formation

While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in exogenously fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public‐goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry/exit, restricted entry with free exit, and free entry with restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group‐level outcomes.     

NONPROFIT EMPLOYEES' MACHIAVELLIAN PROPENSITIES

Nonprofit organizations are held to high ethical standards due to their charitable missions serving the common good. Incidents of fiscal mismanagement within the nonprofit sector make it relevant to assay the ethical principles of employees. This study examines the level of Machiavellian propensities of US nonprofit employees. Results indicate Machiavellian propensities do exist in certain nonprofit employees and these employees agree with questionable behavior. Policy makers and oversight agencies may find these results useful in developing corporate governance and accountability measures for nonprofit organizations. Furthermore, board of director members may use these results to monitor employee actions and address management training.     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.