Optimal macroeconomic policies in a financial and economic crisis: a case study for Slovenia

In this paper, we study different and, in particular, “optimal” reactions of fiscal (and to some extent monetary) policies to the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 in Slovenia, a small open economy that is part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Using an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we simulate the effects of the global crisis under the assumption of no-policy reactions, i.e. assuming that macroeconomic policies are conducted without attempting to deal with the effects of the crisis. Next, we study the possibilities of fiscal policy reducing or even annihilating the effects of the crisis. We also investigate the optimal reaction of fiscal policies based on the assumption that Slovenian policy-makers behave as though they were optimizing an objective function. We show that optimal policies call for only a very modestly active countercyclical role of fiscal policies. There are strong trade-offs between countercyclical fiscal policies and the requirements of fiscal solvency.     

How do the employment effects of job creation schemes differ with respect to the foregoing unemployment duration?

Based on new administrative data for Germany covering entrances into job creation schemes between July 2000 and May 2001, we evaluate the effects of this active labour market policy programme considering the timing of treatment in the individual unemployment spell. Applying propensity score matching in a dynamic setting where the time until treatment in the unemployment spell is stratified into quarters, regional (East and West Germany) as well as gender differences are considered in the estimation. The results in terms of employment present a heterogeneous, but disappointing picture. For West Germany, most of the estimates are insignificant at the end of the observation period, and only one positive exception could be established. In East Germany, none of the groups experiences an improvement of the labour market situation, but the employment chances tend to be reduced due to participation even 30 months after start of programmes.     

Exchange rate determination: a theory of the decisive role of central bank cooperation and conflict

Economists’ faith that variable exchange rates benevolently equilibrate has been empirically disconfirmed. That faith is here tackled at its theoretical core with an exchange rate model that although ultra abstract, includes the undeniable fundamentals of market power and differential goals of central bankers and large-scale private players. It permits a game theoretic analysis under the assumption that all agents maximize their payoffs. The paper then relaxes the assumption of maximising agents, allowing for a more complex and thus realistic second version of the model that is interpretable within SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory of risk and uncertainty. In an experimental setting, this second version of the model points to: a) the inability of agents in central banks, governments and the private real and financial sectors to operate in maximising ways; b) destructive central bank conflict; and c) the widely discrepant outcomes arising from the dynamics of individual personality differences. The paper’s theoretical and empirical findings thus both point to the merits of a single world currency.     

A monotonically converging algorithm for the severity of ruin in a discrete semi-markov risk model

This paper deals with the severity of ruin in a discrete semi-Markov risk model. It is shown that the work of Reinhard and Snoussi (Stochastic Models, 18) can be extended to cover the case where the premium is an integer value and no restriction on the annual result is imposed. In particular, it is shown that the severity of ruin without initial surplus is solution of a system of equations. It can be obtained by a monotonically converging algorithm when the claims are bounded.     

Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model

We consider a simple business cycle model of the multiplier–accelerator type with an infinite time horizon. The result of present wage bargaining influences not only present incomes but also the future bargaining positions. Although the bargaining parties pursue long-run goals, they cannot commit themselves for more than one period. The solution concept combines the local application of Nash's bargaining theory with the idea of subgame consistency. It is shown that the game theoretic solution exists and is unique. There is a surprising similarity between extremely myopic and extremely far-sighted bargaining behavior.