Memory Effects of Different Relational Links between Brands and Sponsored Events

Sport sponsorship is an important marketing communication tool, and stakes in sponsorship deals are high. Therefore, sponsors strive to ensure that their investments are effective and protected from competitors—that is, ambusher marketers’ attacks. Still, little is known about how ambush marketing affects sponsor identification and misidentification of ambushers as sponsors. This study investigates levels of sponsor and ambusher identification in three experimental settings, controlling for the presence/absence of an ambusher, communication modality, and response formats. A field study in the context of a large sports event demonstrates the external validity of the findings. The results provide evidence of a nondestructive interference of ambush marketing, indicating that ambush marketing does not necessarily harm sponsor identification. Misidentification of nonsponsors as sponsors occurs because of the indirect link established between the event and the company through ambush marketing, but not as a consequence of other communication activities by a competitor with no link to the event. Finally, a combined sponsor–ambusher perspective indicates that sponsors do not necessarily have a consistent “official sponsor” advantage over ambushers. Findings are discussed with emphasis on implications for sponsors, ambushers, and marketing researchers.     

Bounded Rationality Modeling

This paper deals with bounded rationality as a way to describe behavior and focuses on the question of how to build such boundedly rational models. The first part is a discussion of the reasons why such models are needed and on the situations in which they can be regarded as more particularly useful. The second part examines three strategies of research towards bounded rationality modeling which have emerged in the last ten years and weights them. The concluding remarks offer a first link between the respective typologies of strategies and of situations and calls for additional experimental work by marketing scientists and economists together.     

The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency

This article compares the Recast European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency of 1997, focussed on their scope of application, international jurisdiction and the coordination of main and secondary proceedings. The scopes of both catalogues of norms and their rules on coordination of main and secondary insolvency proceedings reflect one another. However, the Recast EIR makes a significantly greater contribution to the unification of law and is also more fully differentiated and more precise, even if this comes at a price, namely, limited flexibility. The UNCITRAL Model Law made an important contribution to the harmonisation of international insolvency law but requires now modernisation. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stabileres Tarifvertragssystem durch Stärkung der Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung?

The declaration of the general binding of collective agreements plays a minor role in Germany compared to other European countries. In particular, the number of extended wage agreements has declined greatly over the last two decades. Because of the declining bargaining coverage, calls for a stabilisation of the collective bargaining system are increasing. In this context, the greater use of the extension mechanism could play an important role. This article analyses the historical development of the instrument and explains different proposals for reforming the extension mechanism put forward by political parties and trade unions.     

Johan Åkermans Beitrag zur Konjunkturtheorie Zu seinem 80. Geburtstag

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Selbstorganisation von Verbrauchern-theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag referiert die Ergebnisse zweier in den Jahren 1977/78 durchgeführten Befragungen von Vorständen und Mitgliedern von Verbrauchervereinen in der BRD und bringt sie in Zusammenhang mit weiterführenden Argumentationen, die im Rahmen laufender Forschungsvorhaben der AGVP erarbeitet wurden.Ausgehend von einer Analyse der Handlungen von fremd- und selbstorganisierten Verbrauchervereinen wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob die derzeit bestehenden selbstorganisierten Verbrauchervereine eine formale und inhaltliche Alternative zu bestehenden Verbraucherfremdorganisationen bilden.

---

The paper reports on a study of local consumer organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany with and without individual membership. The study is part of a theoretical and empirical evaluation of present consumer policy aiming at the discovery of ways to activate consumer organizations. Above all, the project explores whether organizations with individual membership would be an organizationally feasible and qualitatively preferable alternative.To do this, it was necessary, as a first research step, to evaluate the existing local consumer organizations by considering various aspects of organizational and individual behaviour within them. Questionnaires were constructed for both officials and members of the organizations. The study shows that local consumer organizations with and without individual membership do not differ much in their activities. Distributing information about prices and qualities of goods becomes the main task. The direct membership of consumers in consumer organizations does not automatically lead to a qualitatively different situation.Member consumer organizations—that receive their legitimization because of a connection to the rank-and-file — need active consumers. Therefore, in the second step in this research phase, an attempt was made to explain the extent of individual activity in consumer organizations. It was shown that preference for collective strategies and participative organizational structure were relatively strong predictors. The study shows further that organizations without individual membership tend to resemble member organizations; as the organizational structure becomes rigid, individual activity ceases.

     

European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement

This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin–Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.