Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Based on well-known evidence on labor supply elasticities, several authors have concluded that women should be taxed at lower rates than men. We evaluate the quantitative implications and merits of this proposition. Relative to the current system of taxation, setting a proportional tax rate on married females equal to 4% (8%) increases output and married female labor force participation by about 3.9% (3.4%) and 6.9% (4.0%), respectively. Gender-based taxes improve welfare and are preferred by a majority of households. Nevertheless, welfare gains are higher when the U.S. tax system is replaced by a proportional, gender-neutral income tax.     

Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice

We introduce a social choice axiom called efficiency in the degree of compromise. Our axiom is based on the trade-off between the quantity and quality of support that an alternative receives. What we mean by the quantity of support is the number of voters behind an alternative, while the quality of support is about the definition of being behind depending on the rank of an alternative in voters' preference orderings. Naturally, one can increase the quantity of support of an alternative to the expense of giving up from its quality. We say that an alternative is an efficient compromise if there exists no other alternative with at least an equal quantity of support with a higher quality. Our efficient compromise axiom is based on not choosing inefficient compromises. We introduce it and show that many standard social choice rules of the literature, such as Condorcet-consistent rules, plurality with a runoff, the Borda count and the single transferable vote, may choose inefficient compromises.     

Interlocks and firm performance: The role of uncertainty in the directorate interlock‐performance relationship

We examine how uncertainty influences the performance effects of directorate interlocks. Our study offers a new perspective of directorate interlocks as mechanisms that enable firms to improve performance when confronted with greater uncertainty, suggesting that uncertainty positively moderates the interlock‐performance relationship. This contrasts with the view based on resource dependence theory suggesting networks reduce uncertainty and enhance firm performance, implying that uncertainty mediates the interlock effect upon performance. Using a sample of 3,745 firms across manufacturing industries in the United States during the period 2001–2009, we find support for the moderation argument and less convincing support for mediation, suggesting that firms may not form interlocks necessarily to reduce uncertainty. Instead, firms may create interlocks to enable adaptation and enhance performance when confronted by uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES

May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show also that no rule satisfies the four conditions for domains that are more than slightly larger.     

Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies

In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. Received: 30 May 2001, Accepted: 23 September 2005 JEL Classification: H41 I am grateful to Murat Sertel for his continuous support and encouragement; to G?ksel Asan and Arunava Sen for their invaluable help. I would also like to thank Fikret Adaman, Ahmet Alkan, Salvador Barberá, Semih Koray, Andrei Ratiu, Muhamet Yíldíz, ünal Zenginobuz, an Associate Editor and two referees of the Review of Economic Design for their enlightening comments on previous drafts. Earlier versions of this paper were written during my stay at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona and at the Indian Statistical Institute. Both visits have been possible by the kindness of the host institutions and the financial support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences and Serem Ltd. It is a pleasure for me to express my gratitude to all these institutions. Of course, all possible errors are mine.     

Modelling oil price expectations: Evidence from survey data

Using Consensus Forecast survey data on WTI oil price expectations for 3- and 12-month horizons over the period November 1989 to December 2008, we find that the rational expectation hypothesis is rejected and that none of the traditional extrapolative, regressive and adaptive processes fits the data by itself. We suggest a mixed expectation model defined as a linear combination of these traditional processes, which we interpret as the aggregation of individual mixing behavior and of heterogenous groups of agents using these simple processes. This approach is consistent with the economically rational expectations theory. We show that the target oil price included in the regressive component of this model depends on the long-run marginal cost of crude oil production and on short term macroeconomic fundamentals whose effects are subject to structural changes. For the two horizons, estimation results provide evidence for our mixed expectation model incorporating this break-dependent target price.     

Switching between Expectation Processes in the Foreign Exchange Market: a Probabilistic Approach using Survey Data*

This paper relaxes a fundamental hypothesis commonly accepted in the expectation formation literature: expectations are, unchangingly, either rational or generated by one of the three simple extrapolative, regressive, or adaptive processes. Using expectations survey data provided by Consensus Forecasts on six European exchange rates against the US dollar, we find that the rational expectations hypothesis is rejected at the aggregate level. By implementing a switching‐regression methodology with stochastic choice of regime, we show that the expectation generating process is given at any time by some combination of the three simple processes. An interpretation of this framework in terms of economically rational expectations is suggested.     

Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges

We consider Nash implementation of social choice rules with restricted ranges, i.e., where some of the available alternatives are chosen at no preference profile. We show that the appropriate adaptation of Maskin monotonicity to this context depends on the range of the mechanisms: the wider is this range, the weaker is the monotonicity condition to be used. As a result, mechanisms employing outcome functions which allow for out-of-range alternatives at off-equilibrium messages can Nash implement social choice rules which fail to be Nash implementable by mechanisms whose ranges are restricted to the range of the social choice rule to be implemented. The Walrasian social choice correspondence is a particular instance of this. Moreover, social choice rules which are not Maskin monotonic can be “monotonized” by the addition of artificial out-of-range alternatives—a point we illustrate through Solomon’s Dilemma.     

Choice of exchange rate regime and currency zones

We investigate the choice of exchange rate regimes in different currency zones (the US dollar, Euro and the CFA zones), and geographic regions (Latin America and Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific, Europe, core Europe, and the CFA countries). We control for country and regional heterogeneity, time dummies, endogeneity and perform various robustness checks. Results from regional analysis substantially differ from the aggregate analysis despite controlling for random effects. Even at the regional level controlling for currency zones affects our findings. Regional results are generally robust to regime measurement, and sample changes (number of observations).     

Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters. I am grateful to Attila Tasnadi for his thorough reading of the paper and pointing to an error in an earlier version. I thank Levent Kutlu, Clemens Puppe, Arunava Sen, an anonymous referee and an anonymous AE for their comments. This research is part of the project “Social Perception—A Social Choice Perspective” supported by Istanbul Bilgi University Research Fund. I also acknowledge the support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP).