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Estimation in the interval censoring model is considered. A class of smooth functionals is introduced, of which the mean is an example. The asymptotic information lower bound for such functionals can be represented as an inner product of two functions. In case 1, i.e. one observation time per unobservable event time, both functions can be given explicitly. We mainly consider case 2, with two observation times for each unobservable event time, in the situation that the observation times can not become arbitrarily close to each other. For case 2, one of the functions in the inner product can only be given implicitly as solution to a Fredholm integral equation. We study properties of this solution and, in a sequel to this paper, prove that the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator of the functional asymptotically reaches the information lower bound. 相似文献
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Stochastic dominance and Lorenz dominance are examples of orderings which require unanimous agreement among an infinite set of indices. This paper considers various subsets of inequality measures that respect Lorenz dominance, and assesses the extent to which a small number of indices can reproduce the Lorenz ordering. Using income data for 80 countries, our results suggest that Lorenz dominance can be predicted with 99% accuracy using just 3 or 4 inequality measures, as long as two of them focus on the extreme upper and lower tails of the distribution. In contrast, confining attention to the index families and parameter ranges normally considered may fail to detect the majority of occasions when Lorenz curves intersect. These results lead us to question the faith placed in procedures based on a finite set of inequality indices, and to suggest that similar lessons will apply to other types of unanimity orderings. 相似文献
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Richard P. Mullin 《Journal of Business Ethics》2002,40(3):207-218
Between 1974 and 1988, executives of DuPont, the world's largest producer of CFCs, were confronted with emerging evidence that CFCs were destroying the stratospheric ozone layer. The difficulty that executives face in such cases is that scientific knowledge develops over time and does not necessarily proceed in a straight line toward true conclusions. At the beginning of a new field of research, there is much uncertainty and disagreement among the experts. The solution of the ozone problem required a remarkable cooperation among science, business, and international governments. After looking at the role of DuPont executives in this drama, and the difficulties facing any executive dealing with uncertain science, the paper turns to an evaluation of the field of Business Ethics to see what light it might throw on this and analogous problems. Finally, the paper offers specific suggestions in terms of principles in dealing with uncertain science, and concludes that the course of action that DuPont followed, including some mistakes, can serve as a model for analogous crises. 相似文献
159.
This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance. 相似文献
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance. 相似文献
160.
As developing countries search for ways to promote capital formation through the establishment of organized exchanges, they will need to pay more attention to the role of risk management in the securities settlement process. The delivery-versus-payment (DVP) agents that facilitate the process of exchanging securities for funds in most world markets have both the incentive and comparative informational advantage to monitor, measure, and manage risks inherent in the securities settlement system.
Unfortunately, most DVP agents have accomplished this task to date through the cumbersome use of position and net debit limits, capital requirements, and collateral requirements. Such limits and requirements are almost everywhere based on relatively arbitrary criteria that may have no relation to the actual replacement cost, principal, or liquidity risk of the transaction, portfolio, or participant on which they are imposed.
To remedy this shortcoming in the current state of risk management at DVP agents, this article holds out the possibility of integrated, comprehensive risk management processes that emphasize and rely on forward-looking measures of risk for individual brokers and across brokers. Many risk measures could serve the settlement agent's purposes, including "value at risk" (or "VaR"), "below target risk,""below-target probability," and "downside semi-variance." The actual summary risk measure used for risk monitoring and control is not as important as the methodology used to generate that risk measure. "The goal of such a process," as the authors put it, "is to ensure that the risks to which a settlement agent and its residual claimants are exposed are those risks to which the agent's shareholders think they are and want to be exposed." 相似文献
Unfortunately, most DVP agents have accomplished this task to date through the cumbersome use of position and net debit limits, capital requirements, and collateral requirements. Such limits and requirements are almost everywhere based on relatively arbitrary criteria that may have no relation to the actual replacement cost, principal, or liquidity risk of the transaction, portfolio, or participant on which they are imposed.
To remedy this shortcoming in the current state of risk management at DVP agents, this article holds out the possibility of integrated, comprehensive risk management processes that emphasize and rely on forward-looking measures of risk for individual brokers and across brokers. Many risk measures could serve the settlement agent's purposes, including "value at risk" (or "VaR"), "below target risk,""below-target probability," and "downside semi-variance." The actual summary risk measure used for risk monitoring and control is not as important as the methodology used to generate that risk measure. "The goal of such a process," as the authors put it, "is to ensure that the risks to which a settlement agent and its residual claimants are exposed are those risks to which the agent's shareholders think they are and want to be exposed." 相似文献