Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports

We investigate competition between a domestic intellectual property right holder and a foreign imitator and consider how parallel imports affect their profits. We consider a two-country model. Country A is a developed country where intellectual property rights are highly protected, and country B is a developing country where protection is weak. The intellectual property right holder can sell the products for both markets while the imitator cannot export the products to country A. We find that permitting parallel imports can be beneficial for both players because it serves as a commitment device to soften price competition.     

Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate

Recent empirical research documents that an exogenous rise in government purchases in a given country triggers a persistent depreciation of its real exchange rate—which raises an important puzzle, as standard macro models predict an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This paper presents a simple model with limited international risk sharing that can account for the empirical real exchange rate response. When faced with a country-specific rise in government purchases, local households experience a negative wealth effect; they thus work harder, and domestic output increases. Under balanced trade (financial autarky) this supply-side effect is so strong that the terms of trade worsen, and the real exchange rate depreciates. In a bonds-only economy, an increase in government purchases triggers a real exchange rate depreciation, if the rise in government purchases is sufficiently persistent and/or labor supply is highly elastic.     

Productivity,Preferences and UIP Deviations in an Open Economy Business Cycle Model

We show that a flex-price two-sector open economy DSGE model can explain the poor degree of international risk sharing and exchange rate disconnect. We use a suite of model evaluation measures and examine the role of (1) traded and non-traded sectors; (2) financial market incompleteness; (3) preference shocks; (4) deviations from UIP condition for the exchange rates; and (5) creditor status in net foreign assets. We find that there is a good case for both traded and non-traded productivity shocks as well as UIP deviations in explaining the puzzles.     

The Effect of Health and Poverty on Early Childhood Cognitive Development

Although evidence of a link between socioeconomic status and child health has been researched extensively, much less attention has been devoted to studying the link between child health and cognitive development. This paper seeks to determine whether early childhood illnesses and poverty significantly impede cognitive development. The empirical model attempts to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity through the use of panel data models. Results indicate that a child’s cognitive development is not directly related to health problems acquired after birth or socioeconomic standing. Rather, cognitive development is primarily influenced by unobserved child- and family-specific factors that happen to be correlated with health and socioeconomic status. On the other hand, birth weight appears to affect cognitive performance later in childhood, even after taking unobserved heterogeneity into account.     

Price Stability and the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates

We revisit Friedman’s case for flexible exchange rates in a small open economy with several distortions and rigidities and a variety of domestic and external shocks. We find that, for external shocks, the flexible exchange rate regime outperforms the fixed regime independent of the source of domestic nominal rigidities provided that the monetary authorities pursue a policy of strict inflation targeting. For domestic supply shocks, a joint policy of a flexible exchange rate and strict inflation targeting fares well when the main source of nominal rigidities is in the domestic goods markets, but not if rigidities arise in the labor markets.     

An Interpretation of the Collapsing Process of the Bretton Woods System

This paper attempts to determine the environments that market confidence might play a significant role in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We build a game-theoretic model of currency crises where a continuum of small speculators can decide their market confidence and trading positions. In the model, the convertibility of dollar is assumed to exhibit a long-term downtrend due to Triffin’s dilemma. The problem is analyzed on the grounds of both certainty and uncertainty. In the certainty case, we find that if the convertibility of dollar is low enough, a dollar crisis is inevitable, but if the convertibility is in an intermediate range with multiple equilibria, the Bretton Woods system is vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculation. In the uncertainty case, the incidence of the confidence crises will disproportionately increase as the convertibility of dollar falls. Lastly, this paper shows that the Federal Reserve Bank’s secrecy may extend the maximum lifespan of the Bretton Woods system.     

Do Sovereign Defaults Hurt Exporters?

This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally proposed by Rajan and Zingales to test whether sovereign defaults hurt the more export-oriented industries disproportionately, and it finds strong support for this hypothesis. However, contrary to the findings of previous studies, our estimates suggest that the effect of defaults is short-lived.