Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.     

Trades and Quotes: A Bivariate Point Process

This article formulates a bivariate point process to jointlyanalyze trade and quote arrivals. In microstructure models,trades may reveal private information that is then incorporatedinto new price quotes. This article examines the speed of thisinformation flow and the circumstances that govern it. A jointlikelihood function for trade and quote arrivals is specifiedin a way that recognizes that an intervening trade sometimescensors the time between a trade and the subsequent quote. Modelsof trades and quotes are estimated for eight stocks using Tradeand Quote database (TAQ) data. The essential finding for thearrival of price quotes is that information flow variables,such as high trade arrival rates, large volume per trade, andwide bid–ask spreads, all predict more rapid price revisions.This means prices respond more quickly to trades when informationis flowing so that the price impacts of trades and ultimatelythe volatility of prices are high in such circumstances.     

Discontinuous innovation and supply relationships: strategic dalliances

The authors address the need for supply relationships to generate, support, and respond to discontinuous innovation (DI), noting that established ways of working appear insufficient. The peculiarities of DI are explained and contrasted with well-known concepts within innovation. The need for customer firms to be both closely collaborative with suppliers while also exploring potential, unpredictable DI elsewhere is proposed, by means of strategic dalliances . A model is presented for understanding and exploring this emerging management challenge.     

坚持社会科学与自然科学并重

党的十六大报告指出：“坚持社会科学和自然科学并重，充分发挥哲学社会科学在经济和社会发展中的重要作用。”为什么要坚持社会科学与自然科学并重？我们的体会是：第一、马克思主义科学是社会科学发展史上的最高成就，它是我们认识和改造社会、促进社会进步的最强大的精神武     

Cultural influences on the design of incentive systems: The case of East Asia

Arguing that culture moderates the potency of various incentives in motivating employees, we propose a culture-contingent model of incentive system design in this article. Four nation-level determinants of culture are identified: historical events, economic/political structure, geographical location, and language characteristics. Based on evidence found in East Asia, specific propositions that either relate a national characteristic to some cultural attributes or predict how a cultural characteristic favours a particular type of incentive system are generated. The implications of this culture-contingent model for incentive system design in multinational firms are discussed.We would like to thank Donna Randall for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.