Price rigidities and institutional variations in markets with posted prices

Summary Standard laboratory posted-offer markets respond slowly and incompletely to demand shocks. In these one-sided markets, where sellers control the setting of prices, very little information is transmitted via the process of exchange. For this reason, traders have trouble distinguishing randomness in their own experience from changes in market fundamentals. This paper reports the results of twelve laboratory markets conducted to assess whether some common variants to standard posted-offer rules can correct the adjustment deficiences. Although discounting, multiple postings and excess demand information all improve performance, we find that response remains poor, and efficiencies low.Support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation (SBR 9319842 and SBR 9320044), and the University of Virginia Bankard Fund. Data are archived at FTP address: fido.econlab.arizona.edu. We wish to thank Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The Recognition and Timing of Deferred Tax Liabilities

Abstract:   This paper examines the characteristics of firms that account for deferred tax liabilities related to government investment grants under an extended adoption timing period. Not only the recognition but also the timing decision is associated with changes in future performance and changes in the debt structure. Recognisers outperform non‐recognisers in the future, while early recognition is related to post recognition performance but only for those firms that currently perform well. Changes in the balance sheet structure are also related to both decisions. Firms with recent increases in the debt level tend to postpone recognition, while currently well‐performing firms that increase their future debt level are less likely to recognise deferred taxes.     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF 12B–1 PLANS ON MUTUAL FUND EXPENSE RATIOS

In this paper we re-examine the effect of 12b–1 payments on mutual fund expense ratios by analyzing data from 1988 through 1991. The findings are consistent with previous studies that find charges are a dead-weight cost borne by shareholders. However, we show that this cost increases over time.     

The treatment of racial and sexual discrimination in economics journals and economics textbooks: 1972 to 1987

This article examines two decades of scholarly literature on discrimination and two decades of discussion of discrimination in economics textbooks. At first discrimination was taken seriously and policy responses adequate to the problem were advocated. Today this is a minority position. The article first traces the way thatJEL policies concerning indexing and abstracting have contributed to this change. Next textbooks are analyzed to show how this change is manifested in commonly used curricular materials. Finally, political preferences are shown to undergird crucial arguments like those concerning minimum wages. Conclusions linking ideology to research agendas are put forward.     

Sources of Bank Interest Rate Risk

We investigate bank stocks'sensitivity to changes in interest rates and the factors affecting this sensitivity. We focus on whether the exposure of commercial banks to interest rate risk is conditioned on certain balance sheet and income statement ratios. We find a significantly negative relation between bank stock returns and changes in interest rates over the period 1991–1996. We also find that bank characteristics measured from basic financial statement information explain bank stocks'sensitivity to interest rate changes. These results suggest that bank managers, analysts, and regulators can use this information to assess the relative risk exposure of banks.     

The effectiveness of different mechanisms for integrating marketing and R&D

The integration of marketing and R&D is a major concern for companies that want to improve their new product performance (NPP). For this integration, companies are using mechanisms such as physical proximity, cross-functional teams, and job rotation. This study examines the effectiveness of these mechanisms by developing a model that distinguishes between indirect effects of mechanisms on NPP (i.e., through a higher level of integration) and direct effects. The model is tested with data collected from 148 pharmaceutical companies. We were able to measure and compare the effectiveness of seven different integration mechanisms, which produced insights that are interesting and relevant for theory as well as practice.
We found that housing marketing and R&D closer to each other and using an influential cross-functional phase review board are the most effective mechanisms to foster integration. Equal remuneration and career opportunities for marketing and R&D and cross-functional teams are somewhat less effective, whereas personnel movement and informal social group events contribute little. ICT appears to be a very effective tool for enhancing NPP. ICT not only fosters integration between marketing and R&D, but it also has an independent direct positive effect on NPP. Through ICT the day-to-day communication between the different parties in the companies becomes much easier, and we think that this fosters the knowledge creation process within marketing and R&D. For cross-functional phase review boards we found a negative direct effect on NPP. Notwithstanding its strong positive effect on integration, a price is paid in terms of NPP. This may be related to the amount of formalization and complexity accompanying this mechanism.     

Initial Margin Requirements, Volatility, and the Individual Investor: Insights from Japan

Initial margin requirements represent: (1) a cost impediment to the wealth constrained investor and (2) a potential way of mitigating excessive volatility. However, prior empirical research finds that margins are not an effective tool in reducing volatility. We consider the possibility that margins primarily affect certain stocks and investors. Specifically, we test whether margins affect individuals who, as a group, we believe to be the investors most affected when margin requirements change. Our initial empirical tests, however, do not support this contention.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.