If the Banks are Doing So Well,Why Can't I Get a Loan? Regulatory Constraints to Financial Inclusion in Indonesia

Indonesia's financial sector has two paradoxes: (i) Indonesia has been a global leader in microfinance for the past 25 years, but access to microfinance services is declining; and (ii) Indonesia's commercial banks are liquid, solvent, and profitable, and the Indonesian economy has been doing well over the past decade, but small and medium enterprises are facing a credit crunch. Although Indonesia is underbanked, most commercial banks have been unresponsive to unmet effective demand. The behavior of banks has been in their own short‐term best interests, primarily because of the unintended consequences of Indonesia's financial sector reregulation after the East Asian crisis and contradictory monetary policies, which have produced a prudentially sound but inefficient, narrow, and homogenized banking oligopoly. Indonesia should not respond to financial exclusion by artificially pumping out and administratively allocating more credit. Instead, it should promulgate smart regulation so that banks maintain their sound risk management without pursuing noncompetitive and noninclusive business practices.     

The extent to which unbalanced schedules cause distortions in sports league tables

The Australian Football League (AFL) has operated its fixture on the basis of an unbalanced schedule since the league expanded from 12 to 14 teams in 1987. This system contains a number of factors (some random) determining the set of bilateral combinations of teams that play each other on an extra occasion during the course of the season, not least of all maximising attendances. While the status quo may be unavoidable to some extent (it is also a bone of contention to many fans), its implications for within-season measures of competitive balance are nonetheless obvious. This is because of the potential for biases being created in the end-of-season league table as a result of the unbalanced schedule. This paper uses a modified model to correct for this inherent bias over the seasons 1997–2008, and the results are discussed in detail. The model is also generalisable to many unbalanced schedule designs observed in professional sports leagues worldwide.     

Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice

This paper investigates initial allocation choices in an international tradable pollution permit market. For two sovereign governments, we compare allocation choices that are either simultaneously or sequentially announced. We show sequential allocation announcements result in higher (lower) aggregate emissions when announcements are strategic substitutes (complements). Whether allocation announcements are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the relationship between the follower’s damage function and governments’ abatement costs. When the marginal damage function is relatively steep (flat), allocation announcements are strategic substitutes (complements). For quadratic abatement costs and damages, sequential announcements provide a higher level of aggregate emissions.     

Are incentives against economic justice?

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the “preference revelation game form” associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is preserved according to agents' true preferences). (ii) A corollary is that the GMRF solutions “naturally implement” the no-envy solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria.     

Information-constrained optima with retrading: An externality and its market-based solution

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless preferences have special, restrictive properties. The externality is internalized by allowing agents to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the spot price or interest rate, over and above contracting on actions and outputs. Then competitive equilibria are equivalent with the appropriate notion of constrained Pareto optimality. Examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals or price-islands, created endogenously in equilibrium.     

Asset prices in a Huggett economy

This paper explores asset pricing in economies where there is no direct insurance against idiosyncratic risks but other assets can be used for self-insurance, subject to exogenously-imposed borrowing limits. We analyze an endowment economy, based on Huggett (1993) [11], both with and without aggregate risk. Our main innovation is that we obtain full analytical tractability by studying the case with “maximally tight” borrowing constraints. We illustrate by looking at riskless bonds, equity, and the term structure of interest rates, and we show that the model can reproduce many features of observed asset prices when idiosyncratic risks are quantitatively reasonable.     

Domestic trade protection in vertically-related markets

We consider trade policy in a setting where home country firms are fully dependent on vertically-integrated foreign firms for supplies of a key input. We find that vertically-integrated firms' strategic considerations play an important role and that, in particular, a tariff on final goods may either increase or decrease the domestic price of final goods. The import of final goods is always taxed to extract and shift rents from foreign firms, while the import of intermediate goods can be either taxed or subsidized. The market structure is shown to be an important consideration when making trade policy.     

The distributional impact of large dams: Evidence from cropland productivity in Africa

We examine the distributional impact of large dams on cropland productivity in Africa. As our unit of analysis we use a hydrology based spatial breakdown of the continent that allows one to exactly define regions in terms of their upstream/downstream relationship at a highly disaggregated level. We then use satellite data to derive measures of cropland productivity within these areas. Our econometric analysis shows that while regions downstream benefit from large dams, no beneficial effects accrue to cropland within the vicinity. Moreover, we find that the productivity enhancing impact of upstream dams is dependent on the local climate. Overall our results suggest that upstream dams have quantitatively on average provided up to 12% of the minimum daily per capita amount of kilocalorie needs in downstream communities and increased agricultural production by 1%.