Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

Beta-product dependent Pitman–Yor processes for Bayesian inference

Multiple time series data may exhibit clustering over time and the clustering effect may change across different series. This paper is motivated by the Bayesian non-parametric modelling of the dependence between clustering effects in multiple time series analysis. We follow a Dirichlet process mixture approach and define a new class of multivariate dependent Pitman–Yor processes (DPY). The proposed DPY are represented in terms of vectors of stick-breaking processes which determine dependent clustering structures in the time series. We follow a hierarchical specification of the DPY base measure to account for various degrees of information pooling across the series. We discuss some theoretical properties of the DPY and use them to define Bayesian non-parametric repeated measurement and vector autoregressive models. We provide efficient Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithms for posterior computation of the proposed models and illustrate the effectiveness of the method with a simulation study and an application to the United States and the European Union business cycle.     

On the relationship among efficiency,capitalization and risk: does management matter in local banking market?

By employing a Granger causality methodology in a panel data framework, this article explores the relationship among efficiency, capitalization and credit risk within the local Italian banking system. Focusing the attention on cooperative banks, we specifically test whether managers take more risks in highly concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly) than in partially competitive markets (i.e. duopoly). The evidence shows that in more concentrated markets, management efficiency generates a decrease in risk-taking (rejecting the bad management hypothesis) with respect to the partially competitive markets. Results are consistent with the idea that banks with less local competition are able to increase their profits by indulging more freely in rent-seeking behaviour, minimizing their risk-taking and, consequently, improving the quality of their assets through additional screening processes. The financial crisis does not seem to affect the conduct of management in terms of bank investment decisions and risk-taking. A series of robustness tests generally confirms our findings.     

Modelling the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture: a minimum‐data approach*

We argue that to support agriculture–environmental policy decision making, stakeholders need ‘quantitative back‐of‐the‐envelope’ analysis that is timely and sufficiently accurate to make informed decisions. We apply this concept to the analysis of the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture. We present a spatially explicit production model and show how it can be used to derive the supply of ecosystem services in a region. This model shows that the supply of ecosystem services can be derived from the spatial distribution of opportunity cost of providing those services. We then show how this conceptual model can be used to develop a minimum‐data (MD) approach to the analysis of the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture that can be implemented with the kinds of secondary data that are available in most parts of the world. We apply the MD approach to simulate the supply of carbon that could be sequestered in agricultural soils in the dryland grain‐producing region of Montana. We find that the supply curve derived from the MD approach can approximate the supply curve obtained from a more elaborate model based on site‐specific data, and can do so with sufficient accuracy for policy analysis.     

MULTIDIMENSIONAL DISTANCE‐TO‐COLLAPSE POINT AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULT PREDICTION

By focusing on sovereign defaults, this paper introduces a multidimensional distance‐to‐collapse point based on a two‐step procedure. The first step is nonparametric and provides an early warning system that signals a potential crisis whenever preselected leading indicators exceed specific thresholds. The second is parametric and incorporates the first‐step country default predictors within a probit specification. Such a two‐step procedure generalizes the distance‐to‐default à la Merton within a multidimensional setting, wherein we care about the distance of each indicator from its threshold. Empirical evidence about debt crises of emerging markets over the period 1975–2002 proves that our methodology predicts 80% of the total defaults and non‐defaults in and out of sample. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Beta and Size in the Cross-Section of European Stock Returns

This paper examines the ability of beta and size to explain cross-sectional variation in average returns in 12 European countries. We find that average stock returns are positively related to beta and negatively related to firm size. The beta premium is in part due to the fact that high beta countries outperform low beta countries. Within countries high beta stocks outperform low beta stocks only in January, not in other months. We reject the hypothesis that differences in average returns on size- and beta-sorted portfolios can be explained by market risk and exposure to the excess return of small over large stocks (SMB). Consistent with recent US evidence, we find that after controlling for size, there is no association between average returns and exposure to SMB.     

Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are affected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term—logit distribution—one is able to calculate exactly the stationary distribution of the perturbed Markov process for any level of noise. We show that the stationary distribution places the largest probability on the maximizers of weighted sums of the agents’ (intrinsic) utilities, and this probability tends to 1 as noise vanishes.     

Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption

What is the relationship between government corruption and firm performance? To address this question, I conduct a review of articles published in the leading management journals on government‐business interactions pertaining to rent‐seeking activities and integrate findings from the fields of international business, social issues in management, public organization, institutional change, and corporate political activity. I find that while much empirical work corroborates the earlier findings suggesting a corrosive impact of government corruption on firm performance in general, management research also points to the heterogeneous impact of government corruption on individual firm performance, driven by the strategic activities conducted by firms in response to corruption. I propose an integrative model of firm strategy vis‐à‐vis corruption that predicts the activity choice of the firm as predicated by its organizational structure, political resources, industry regulation, and surrounding political and social institutions.