Choice Consistency and Preference Stability in Test-Retests of Discrete Choice Experiment and Open-Ended Willingness to Pay Elicitation Formats

This study tests the temporal stability of preferences, choices and willingness to pay (WTP) values using both discrete choice experiment (DCE) and open-ended (OE) WTP elicitation formats. The same sample is surveyed three times over the course of two years using each time the same choice sets. Choice consistency is positively correlated with choice certainty and choice complexity. The impact of choice complexity fades away in time, most likely as a result of learning and preference refinement. Although the OE WTP values remain stable over a time period of 2 years as in previous stated preference studies, DCE based WTP measures differ significantly, suggesting their use in benefits transfer may be limited.     

How Internet technologies impact information flows in R&D: reconsidering the technological gatekeeper

Previous studies have firmly established the technological gatekeeper to be a key node in the innovation process – acquiring, translating, and disseminating external information throughout the R&D unit. However, the gatekeeper concept has received modest attention in recent times. We argue that the concept needs to be re‐examined in light of the recent advances in Internet technologies that have dramatically altered how knowledge workers source and share their information. Drawing on social network analysis and interview evidence from a medical devices R&D group, we find that the gatekeeper role is still vital, but no longer needs to be performed by a single individual. Instead, the modern R&D group can keep abreast of the latest technological advances through a combination of Internet‐enabled internal and external communication specialists. This study makes a number of important contributions. The gatekeeper theory is extended through the development of an updated conceptual framework. We also discuss the practical implications of our findings and advise R&D managers on how to organise resources to maximise optimal information flows.     

The Life Cycle of the U.S. Tire Industry

We introduce a new theory of industry evolution. According to our model, the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers found in many young industries is a consequence of the gradual decline in unit costs. Early stages of the industry life cycle, when unit costs and profit margins are high, display positive net entry rates. In later stages, declining unit costs and increasing competition limit the market room for (fringe) firms accumulating in a shakeout. The model explains paths of output, price level, and firm numbers using a recursive system of equations. We apply the model to the U.S. tire industry.     

Income tax reform for a globalized world: The case for a dual income tax

Countries that are industrialized, or becoming so, must adopt tax systems that are capable of raising considerable amounts of revenue efficiently, equitably and with administrative simplicity, while at the same time coping with the competitive features of a globalized world economy. A component of that tax system will be direct taxation of households alongside general sales and payroll taxation. This paper addresses the role that capital income taxes should play in the income tax system. Arguments for the preferential treatment of capital income are summarized, and a case is made for adopting a schedular approach in which capital and labor income are taxed according to separate rate structures. The particular case of the dual income tax system used in the Nordic countries is advocated whereby capital income is taxed at a low, flat rate and non-capital income is taxed progressively. It is argued that this system best combines the objectives of a good tax system in an internationally competitive environment.     

Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products

We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, “coordination failure” underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not rely on assumptions regarding strategic substitutability or complementarity of precommitments.     

Farmers' Preference for Farming: Evidence From a Nationally Representative Farm Survey in India

Using data from a nationally representative farm survey in India, we have analyzed Indian farmers' stated preference for farming as a profession. Findings show that more than 40% of farmers dislike farming as a profession because of low profits, high risk, and lack of social status, yet they continue with it owing to a lack of opportunities outside agriculture. Farmers who express a preference for moving out of agriculture are mostly those with small landholdings, poor irrigation facilities, fewer productive assets including livestock, and follow a cereal‐centric cropping pattern. They also have relatively lower access to credit, insurance, and information, and are weakly integrated with social networks such as self‐help groups and farmers' organizations. Importantly, the disinclination for farming, conditional on other covariates, is not significantly differentiated by caste, an important indicator of social status in rural India. Yet, within a caste group, the dislike for farming moderates with larger landholdings.     

Are stricter investment rules contagious? Host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements

We argue that competitive diffusion is a driver of the trend toward international investment agreements with stricter investment rules, namely defensive moves of developing countries concerned about foreign direct investment (FDI) diversion in favor of competing host countries. Accounting for spatial dependence in the formation of bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements that contain investment provisions, we find that the increase in agreements with stricter provisions on investor-to-state dispute settlement and pre-establishment national treatment is a contagious process. Specifically, a developing country is more likely to sign an agreement with weak investment provisions if other developing countries that compete for FDI from the same developed country have previously signed agreements with similarly weak provisions. Conversely, contagion in agreements with strong provisions exclusively derives from agreements with strong provisions that other FDI-competing developing countries have previously signed with a specific developed source country of FDI.