Rethinking political correctness

Legal and cultural changes over the past 40 years ushered unprecedented numbers of women and people of color into companies' professional ranks. Laws now protect these traditionally underrepresented groups from blatant forms of discrimination in hiring and promotion. Meanwhile, political correctness has reset the standards for civility and respect in people's day-to-day interactions. Despite this obvious progress, the authors' research has shown that political correctness is a double-edged sword. While it has helped many employees feel unlimited by their race, gender, or religion,the PC rule book can hinder people's ability to develop effective relationships across race, gender, and religious lines. Companies need to equip workers with skills--not rules--for building these relationships. The authors offer the following five principles for healthy resolution of the tensions that commonly arise over difference: Pause to short-circuit the emotion and reflect; connect with others, affirming the importance of relationships; question yourself to identify blind spots and discover what makes you defensive; get genuine support that helps you gain a broader perspective; and shift your mind-set from one that says, "You need to change," to one that asks, "What can I change?" When people treat their cultural differences--and related conflicts and tensions--as opportunities to gain a more accurate view of themselves, one another, and the situation, trust builds and relationships become stronger. Leaders should put aside the PC rule book and instead model and encourage risk taking in the service of building the organization's relational capacity. The benefits will reverberate through every dimension of the company's work.     

A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.     

Customer account relationships and e-retail banking usage<Superscript>1</Superscript>

Financial institutions are actively developing new electronic banking products for their retail customers. To date, the market leaders have drawn a disproportionably higher share of e-retail banking customers. In response, smaller institutions have become quite active in exploring ways to participate profitably in online banking. A major influence is from a customer relationship management (CRM) perspective, where institutions try to limit the outflow of current customers and direct high-value customers to potential products from a multi-product service offering array. These efforts can succeed only if retail bank marketers focus the promotion of the new products and services that can utilise this channel toward those customers who are most likely to find them attractive. The first aim of this study was to examine the role that online and electronic banking play in defining the customer's primary financial relationship. The analysis of 701 retail customers of a financial institution presented in this study suggests that banks and other institutions are highly vulnerable to loss of customers to rivals with extensive online services. A second aim was to examine to what extent information on banking relationships is able to extend CRM analysis beyond that offered by typical demographic and income data. Current customer account relationships are found to be highly predictive of use of electronic services use in general. And, interest in the use of specific online services is related to differing customer relationships in addition to ordinary demographic and balance information. These findings can be useful for retail banking in identifying potential high-value users from a customer relationship management perspective.     

Credit unions and risk

The structure of the credit union industry has been transformed by regulatory changes and the subsequent switch by many credit unions to community and multiple-bond fields of membership. This study explores the impact of these trends by testing for differences in risk across credit unions with different field-of-membership types. In tests for differences in risk of bankruptcy and of breaching regulatory standards, risk is found to be greater for credit unions with broader field-of-membership types. These differences in risk appear to derive from greater earnings volatility and lower ROA and net-worth ratios at community and multiple-bond credit unions. These differences in risk decline with greater asset size. Evidence is also presented that credit unions that switched from single-bond institutions to broader field-of-membership types now operate with greater risk.     

Conditional comonotonicity

Abstract In this paper we propose a generalization of the notion of comonotonicity by introducing and exploring the concept of conditional comonotonicity. We characterize this notion and we show by examples that conditional comonotonicity is the natural extension of the concept of comonotonicity to dynamic settings. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 90A05, 60Gxx Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D910, C610, G120     

Beyond conjoint analysis: Advances in preference measurement

We identify gaps and propose several directions for future research in preference measurement. We structure our argument around a framework that views preference measurement as comprising three interrelated components: (1) the problem that the study is ultimately intended to address; (2) the design of the preference measurement task and the data collection approach; (3) the specification and estimation of a preference model, and the conversion into action. Conjoint analysis is only one special case within this framework. We summarize cutting edge research and identify fruitful directions for future investigations pertaining to the framework’s three components and to their integration.     

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.     

Vector-valued coherent risk measures

We define (d,n)-coherent risk measures as set-valued maps from into satisfying some axioms. We show that this definition is a convenient extension of the real-valued risk measures introduced by Artzner et al. [2]. We then discuss the aggregation issue, i.e., the passage from valued random portfolio to valued measure of risk. Necessary and sufficient conditions of coherent aggregation are provided.Received: February 2004, Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B30, 46E30JEL Classification: D81, G31