Your new product development (NPD) is only as good as your process: an exploratory analysis of new NPD process design and implementation

Given industry competitiveness, how do firms' new product development (NPD) process designs differ when responding to an innovation mandate? How do NPD design elements differ across firms when implementing NPD processes? These design elements are strategic business unit (SBU) senior management involvement, business case content, customer interactions, and cross‐functional integration. What are the consequences of different combinations of NPD process design elements for innovation productivity? We explore these questions via a collective case study of newly implemented NPD process designs at three different SBUs of a major US‐based international conglomerate, 1 year after receiving the mandate to grow through innovation. Our analysis suggests that industry competitiveness and firm characteristics influence the NPD process design as SBUs employ distinct combinations of NPD design elements. The differential emphasis on design elements leads to variation in process design and divergence in innovation productivity.     

Islamic finance and market segmentation: Implications for the cost of capital

This paper considers the impact of full Islamic shari’ya compliance on developing stock exchanges in their effective provision of development capital. Evidence from a unique study focussing on the Sudan telecommunications company and its listings on the Khartoum as well as Arabian Gulf stock exchanges reveals that costs of capital are considerably higher in the former than latter markets. While there are firm governance benefits arising from Islamic finance monitoring costs are substantial and the banking system is better placed to administer financing arrangements. Larger firms are better placed to circumvent this segmentation through cross-listing on regional exchanges.     

The Effects of Competition in Short Product Life‐Cycle Markets: The Case of Motion Pictures*

It is critically important to understand the relationship between new product launch strategies and their interaction with the competitive environment, which results in the successful introduction of new products. Deciding when to launch new products is among the most significant issues facing managers when formulating new products strategy, especially for products with short product life cycles. However, little extant research has focused on the interaction of product launch timing and the competitive market environment. This study explores the effects of four types of competitive threats on the market performance of short product life‐cycle products. Threats from new products and incumbents are possible. Also, products in the same category and those in related product categories exert competitive pressures. In this paper, a framework of competitive threats is developed, and research questions are constructed and empirically tested using the motion pictures industry as the focus of this research. A set of simultaneous equations was estimated using a sample of 2,948 movies introduced in the U.S. market between 1997 and 2004. The results show that all competition types have negative direct, indirect (as mediated by distribution intensity), and total effects on the performance of a new product. For a focal product, incumbent products exert a greater negative impact on performance than new entrants. Surprisingly, products in different, but related, categories are more harmful to the performance of products than products in the same category. The results have important implications for launch timing and new product performance.     

Success Determinants when Tendering for International Consulting Projects

A unique database on individual proposals is used to analyse competition among consulting firms (CFs) for international projects. CFs, which sell services based on human capital, focus on developing countries when operating abroad and, thereby, are highly dependent on development agencies (DAs). The DAs have strict tender rules and claim that skill and experience are the most important factors when proposals are evaluated. Both economic theory and the results of the estimations suggest, however, that long-term relationships (LTRs) between the CFs and the clients are at least as important as traditional skill and experience factors. The LTRs are here measured by means of information about whether the CF has previously worked for the client (repeat purchases) or has visited the client. The results indicate that the client in some cases has pre-decided which CF to select. The client invites several CFs to compete for the tender anyway, either because he is forced to do so by the financier, or because he wants to subject an old supplier to competitive pressure. As the tender rules do not seem to be followed, a policy implication would be that the DAs can skip, or at least relax, their strict tender rules, or strengthen the sanctions associated with violations of the rules.     

Uniform and Non-Uniform Second-Best Input Taxes

We investigate second-best, input-based taxes foragricultural nonpoint pollution control when marketprices are endogenous and production isheterogeneous. Theoretically, we derive the optimalforms of taxes which take account of heterogeneity(non-uniform taxes) and a tax which does not (auniform tax). Empirically, we use a multi-factor,market-equilibrium simulation model to determineoptimal tax rates and associated equity effects,particularly differences in landowner gains/lossesacross a heterogeneous region. When market prices areendogenous, second-best tax policies result inpecuniary externalities that affect existingenvironmental externalities. In particular, thepecuniary externalities amplify the effect of producerheterogeneity on determination of sub-regionaldifferences in tax rates and returns to land,particularly for the uniform policy. With endogenousprices, the uniform tax rate is considerably higherthan any of the non-uniform rates and, ironically, thenon-uniform taxes result in less dispersion oflandowner gains across sub-regions than the uniformtax.     

Initiating Negotiations: The Role of Machiavellianism, Risk Propensity, and Bargaining Power

Initiation is an often-overlooked yet essential stage of the negotiation process. This study examined the effects of two measures of personality—Machiavellianism and risk propensity—and relative bargaining power (as based on multiple situational factors) on three phases of the initiation process—engaging a counterpart, making a request, and optimizing the request. Using a multi-scenario approach, one hundred fifteen participants indicated their initiation preferences for three distinct negotiations. The results of repeated measures ANOVAs indicate that bargaining power influences an individual’s decision to initiate negotiations. In addition, those high in Machiavellianism choose to initiate negotiations even when relative bargaining power is low, whereas those high in risk propensity tend to optimize their requests. The implications of these findings for practitioners and future research are discussed.     

Strong price of anarchy

A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to the social optimum. Differently from the Price of Anarchy (defined as the ratio of the worst Nash Equilibrium to the social optimum), it quantifies the loss incurred from the lack of a central designer in settings that allow for coordination.We study the SPoA in two settings, namely job scheduling and network creation. In the job scheduling game we show that for unrelated machines the SPoA can be bounded as a function of the number of machines and the size of the coalition. For the network creation game we show that the SPoA is at most 2. In both cases we show that a strong equilibrium always exists, except for a well defined subset of network creation games.