Quantitative easing and asset bubbles

Expansionary monetary policy is necessary to respond to financial crises. However, if Central Bank asset purchase initiatives are too large or last too long, they can lead to explosive increases in asset prices which add to the risk of a future crisis. This article employs two models including the Campbell–Shiller and Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller techniques to search for bubbles in the US equity, housing and bond markets over the past eight years. Although, we find that prices in equities and housing have risen following Federal Reserve intervention, there is little indication of asset price bubbles. There is evidence of explosive bond price increases from September of 2011 to February of 2013.     

International Monetary Policy: A Global Taylor Rule

John Taylors rule for setting interest rates provides a framework for studying the global monetary policy generated by individual countries pursing their own policy goals. The study reflects the global nature of monetary policy by modeling an aggregate short-term interest rate as a function of measures of worldwide inflation and the GDP gap. Multiple specifications are estimated to correspond to past studies of the U.S. relationships between these variables. The authors find that Taylor rule is a useful tool for characterizing the global monetary environment as his equation provides a good fit to the data in every specification explored by the authors. However, the international response to inflation is slightly less robust despite claims of inflation targeting by the bulk of the larger economies in the sample.     

An experimental study of blind proficiency tests in forensic science

We conducted a series of sender?Creceiver experiments to study the consequences of implementing a regime of blind proficiency tests in forensic science to reduce error rates and improve the criminal justice system. Senders are our surrogate for forensic laboratories and receivers, for the judge or jury. Our experimental surrogate (random audits with a penalty) for blind proficiency tests reduced sender error rates by as much as 46% depending on the level of experimentally induced bias. When penalties improve information quality, receiver error rates fell by as much as 26% depending on the level of the sender bias. We also find that the penalty must be large relative to the payoff to induce the reduction in errors. Our results suggest that a regime of blind proficiency testing has the potential to reduce forensic science errors.     

An international comparison of the determinants of retail gross margins

In this paper we compare the results of applying a new economic framework for the analysis of retail gross margins to 1982 interindustry retail data for France, Germany, and the U.S. Use of the same theoretical framework and econometric methodology separately for each of the three bodies of data yields robust empirical regularities with respect to functional form and the role of distribution services in explaining retail gross margins. An interesting feature of these results is that they arise despite substantial differences in classification and in the retail environment of the three countries.We thank E. Hoffnar and P. MacNeill for excellent research assistance. We acknowledge the financial support of INSEAD's R&D department for project R2135. We also thank the CSC at Maryland for support. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the MIT Northeast Marketing Colloquium, the Simon Graduate School of Management at the University of Rochester, the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago, the Yale School of Organization and Management, the School of Business Administration at the University of Washington, and the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission. We thank the participants in these seminars for their constructive criticisms. We are especially indebted to Peter Rossi of the University of Chicago, who provided us with helpful written comments, and to Herr Krockow of the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, who provided us with unpublished data.     

Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets

Summary This paper defines a choice process over social outcomes in which agents choose the institutional rules ormechanisms themselves without outside interference. Truly endogenizing the mechanism selection process in this way, however, involves facing an infinite regress problem in which outcomes are chosen by games which are themselves chosen by games, ad infinitum. This paper allows the possibility of such an infinite regress which we callfully endogenous mechanism selection.We introduce the notion ofFree Choice which restricts the class of mechanisms in the regress to those which prevent agents from being locked in to an equilibrium outcome by the actions of others. Under this condition, the infinite regress is shown to get truncated with the number of selection iterations endogenously determined. It turns out that the outcomes resulting from a Free Choice-constrained regress are (Weakly) Pareto optimal; in particular, these outcomes solve a weighted Rawlsian Maxmin criterion. We also show that these outcomes are invariant to the equilibrium concept used to evaluate games in the regress.This paper is based on the author's dissertation from the University of Minnesota (November, 1989).I am very grateful for the guidance, advice, and encouragement from my advisor, Marcel K. Richter, and for the many helpful suggestions from David Levine. I have also benefited from conversations with Nabil Al-Najjar, Gerhard Glomm, Leonid Hurwicz, James Jordan, Ramon Marimon, Andrew McClennan, Ariel Rubinstein, and William Thomson.     

The last visitation of the plague in Sweden: the case of Bräkne‐Hoby in 1710–11

In an earlier study of the plague in Colyton, Devon, the household distribution of deaths was studied to see whether this provided a method of identifying the causative disease. In this article, a known epidemic of plague in the Swedish parish of Bräkne‐Hoby was studied as a means of testing out the generality of the household distribution of deaths. It was discovered that, in this case, the very heavy mortality was due to two radically different means of spreading the disease, initially the classic bubonic one through the rat flea, and latterly, and somewhat surprisingly, the pneumonic one, through the infection of the inhabitants by their own friends and neighbours.     

Why Dick and Jane don’t ask: Getting past initiation barriers in negotiations

Negotiation is an essential skill for personal well-being and professional success, a skill that begins with identifying and acting on one's wants and needs. Many individuals, however, lack the confidence, motivation, or training to simply ask for what they want in certain situations; for example, when negotiating with an important client. Still others are reluctant to initiate requests in general. This article discusses the personal characteristics and situational factors that influence an individual's likelihood of engaging another party in a negotiation, making a request, and optimizing that request. Herein, specific suggestions are offered for managing this critical phase of the negotiation process via three steps: mental preparation prior to the engagement; positioning prior to, and at the point of, the engagement; and verbal craftsmanship during the delivery of one's request.