Stock market volatility forecasting: Do we need high-frequency data?

The general consensus in the volatility forecasting literature is that high-frequency volatility models outperform low-frequency volatility models. However, such a conclusion is reached when low-frequency volatility models are estimated from daily returns. Instead, we study this question considering daily, low-frequency volatility estimators based on open, high, low, and close daily prices. Our data sample consists of 18 stock market indices. We find that high-frequency volatility models tend to outperform low-frequency volatility models only for short-term forecasts. As the forecast horizon increases (up to one month), the difference in forecast accuracy becomes statistically indistinguishable for most market indices. To evaluate the practical implications of our results, we study a simple asset allocation problem. The results reveal that asset allocation based on high-frequency volatility model forecasts does not outperform asset allocation based on low-frequency volatility model forecasts.     

How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection

This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products. Our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers, even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice. When customers are wary of the adviser's incentives, contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers. If, instead, customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice, high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation. Policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare. However, prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser's incentive to acquire information. More vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation, but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers.     

Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices

This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market‐share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own‐supplier contracts), intra‐ and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market‐share contracts are feasible. Compared to own‐supplier contracts, the use of market‐share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.     

Plant-level nonconvex output adjustment and aggregate fluctuations

In most manufacturing industries plant-level output is adjusted along three margins of capacity utilization: shiftwork, weekend work, and closing temporarily down. Due to the discrete and lumpy nature of these margins, only a fraction of plants adjust output in response to shocks. In a business cycle model calibrated to establishment-level observations, these nonconvexities make aggregate output less volatile than when plants can adjust smoothly. Further, the mass of adjusting plants is larger in downturns than in upturns, leading to counter-cyclical volatility of aggregate output and government policy being slightly more effective in recessions than in expansions.     

Buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations

We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides, in case of a bilateral disagreement, flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment. A larger buyer pays a higher per‐unit price when buyers' bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low, and a lower price otherwise. An analogous result holds for sellers. These predictions, and the implications of different technologies, are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power.     

Market power,price discrimination,and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.     

Electrification of a city bus network—An optimization model for cost-effective placing of charging infrastructure and battery sizing of fast-charging electric bus systems

The deployment of battery-powered electric bus systems within the public transportation sector plays an important role in increasing energy efficiency and abating emissions. Rising attention is given to bus systems using fast charging technology. This concept requires a comprehensive infrastructure to equip bus routes with charging stations. The combination of charging infrastructure and bus batteries needs a reliable energy supply to maintain a stable bus operation even under demanding conditions. An efficient layout of the charging infrastructure and an appropriate dimensioning of battery capacity are crucial to minimize the total cost of ownership and to enable an energetically feasible bus operation. In this work, the central issue of jointly optimizing the charging infrastructure and battery capacity is described by a capacitated set covering problem. A mixed-integer linear optimization model is developed to determine the minimum number and location of required charging stations for a bus network as well as the adequate battery capacity for each bus line. The bus energy consumption for each route segment is determined based on individual route, bus type, traffic, and other information. Different scenarios are examined in order to assess the influence of charging power, climate, and changing operating conditions. The findings reveal significant differences in terms of required infrastructure. Moreover, the results highlight a trade-off between battery capacity and charging infrastructure under different operational and infrastructure conditions. This paper addresses upcoming challenges for transport authorities during the electrification process of the bus fleets and sharpens the focus on infrastructural issues related to the fast charging concept.     

Who Convinces Whom? Parent and Child Perceptions of Children's Engagement in Parental Purchase Decisions

Do children overestimate their engagement in parental purchase decisions? A systematic analysis of the articles enabled us to create a database of 149 cases where child and parent perceptions of children's engagement in parental purchase decisions were measured. The findings proved that there is congruence between children's and parents' perception of a child's engagement in most cases. Children's overestimation of their engagement in a parental decision to purchase products is likely the exception rather than the rule. The cases characterized as overestimations are related to product category and type of measured domain. (Children tend to overestimate their engagement more when the measures track participation or influence rather than decision independence.)