The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?

We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks. Our results suggest that most of the examined regressors, including factors that capture the effects of inflation and output, are not robust determinants of voting dissent. This result suggests that unobserved characteristics of central bankers and different communication strategies drive the dissent, rather than the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

The impact of board of director oversight characteristics on corporate tax aggressiveness: An empirical analysis

This paper examines the impact of board of director oversight characteristics on corporate tax aggressiveness. Based on a 812 firm-year dataset of 203 publicly-listed Australian firms over the 2006–2009 period, our regression results show that if a firm has established an effective risk management system and internal controls, engages a big-4 auditor, its external auditor’s services involve proportionally fewer non-audit services than audit services and the more independent is its internal audit committee, it is less likely to be tax aggressive. Our additional regression results also indicate that the interaction effect between board of director composition (i.e., a higher ratio of independent directors on the board) and the establishment of an effective risk management system and internal controls jointly reduce tax aggressiveness.     

Learning to Reduce Interorganizational Learning: An Analysis of Architectural Product Innovation in Strategic Alliances*

There is wide agreement in analyses of strategic alliances that, regardless of the purpose of the alliance, members of the partner organizations should engage in intensive mutual learning to make the alliance a success. In contrast to this view, the present article shows that in strategic alliances aimed at product innovations by recombining partners' extant technologies, learning between specialists can be reduced considerably without jeopardizing success. This is made possible through four interconnected mechanisms integrated into the concept of transactive organizational learning (TOL): (1) modularization, which allows specialists of different domains to develop modules to a large extent independently of each other and to concentrate communication between themselves on the design of interfaces between modules; (2) storing of knowledge in artifacts instead of in organizational members' memories; (3) localization of knowledge not present in the project team but for which a need has arisen through transactive memory; and (4) knowledge integration by prototyping (i.e., by repeated testing of modules and of interactions between modules until a satisfactorily working end product is achieved). Although these four mechanisms reduce the need for cross‐learning between specialists of different domains, some common knowledge and some cross‐learning between the partners' specialists is still required. Case studies on four of SAP's strategic alliances for product innovation with different partners lend empirical support to this study's concept. The article concludes with implications for practice: Companies should find out whether the TOL mechanisms that reduce time to market are present, to what extent their potential is exploited, and how well they work together.     

The effect of board of director composition on corporate tax aggressiveness

This study considers the effect of board of director composition on corporate tax aggressiveness. Our logit regression results for a choice-based sample of 32 corporations comprising 16 tax-aggressive corporations and 16 non-tax-aggressive corporations show that the inclusion of a higher proportion of outside members on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. The ordinary least squares regression results from our sensitivity analysis of a cross-section of 401 corporations confirm our main results about board of director composition and tax aggressiveness.     

Distributional conflict in organizations

Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on the division level, where a small number of agents fight over only a fraction of the overall prize. Second, by grouping agents into common divisions, multi-divisional organizations create free-rider problems in rent-seeking. Our model sheds new light on the desirability of divestitures and the transition from the U- to the M-form by US corporations in the 1920s.     

Contractual distortions in a market with frictions

This paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions. While principals (e.g., firms) have all contractual power, their market power is constrained as agents (e.g., workers) can choose to wait and search for better offers. We find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents’ utilities. With type-independent costs of search and waiting, equilibrium contracts are always first-best. If agents are impatient and discount future payoffs, however, distortions vanish only gradually. In the latter case, we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities, both of which are absent in the case of type-independent costs of search.     

Recognizing contributors: an experiment on public goods

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.