Indirect versus Direct Constraints in Markets with Vertical Integration

For an assessment of market power on the wholesale (or merchant) market in the presence of vertically integrated firms, we analyze the interaction of direct constraints, arising from competition on the wholesale market, and of indirect constraints, arising from substitution on the retail market. A vertically integrated firm that still participates in the merchant market exerts both direct and indirect constraints. We analyze the factors that determine the importance of indirect constraints. We find that, in contrast to a common presumption, indirect constraints are sometimes more powerful than direct constraints. We furthermore analyze the incentives of integrated firms to still participate in the merchant market, provided that this is technologically feasible.     

Liberalising Temporary Movement of Natural Persons: An Agenda for the Development Round

We discuss liberalising the temporary mobility of workers under Mode 4 of the GATS, particularly the movement of medium and low skilled service providers between developing and developed countries. Such mobility potentially offers huge returns: a flow equivalent to three per cent of developed countries’ skilled and unskilled work forces would generate an estimated increase in world welfare of over US$150 billion, shared fairly equally between developing and developed countries. The larger part of this emanates from the less‐skilled, essentially because losing higher‐skilled workers cuts output in developing countries severely. The mass migration of less skilled workers raises fears in developed countries for cultural identity, problems of assimilation and the drain on the public purse. These fears are hardly relevant to temporary movement, however. The biggest economic concern from temporary mobility is its competitive challenge to local less skilled workers. But as populations age and the average levels of training and education rise, developed countries will face an increasing scarcity of less skilled labour. Temporary mobility thus actually offers a strong communality of interest between developing and developed countries. The remainder of the paper looks at the GATS provisions on Mode 4 and the commitments that have been made under it. The paper reviews several official proposals for the Doha talks, including the very detailed one from India, and considers several countries’ existing schemes for the temporary movement of foreign workers. Many countries have long had bilateral foreign worker programmes, and some regional agreements provide for liberal and flexible movement. These show what is feasible and how concerns can be overcome. We caution that, to be useful, any WTO agreement must increase mobility, not just bureaucratise it. The paper concludes with some modest and practical proposals. We suggest, inter alia, that licensing firms to arrange the movement of labour is the most promising short‐term approach to increasing temporary mobility.     

TREATMENT OF SUBSIDIES IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS*

This document contains a critical analysis of some aspects of the treatment of subsidies in the present system of national accounts (United Nations SNA and the ESA, i.e. the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts) as background to the current discussion of their revision. One of the conventions used is that subsidies are recorded as a resource in the accounts of the market producer units which actually receive them. Should this rule of the receiver be applied in every case? The paper suggests that it would be preferable to attribute subsidies to the beneficiary in those cases where a subsidy received by one unit is the counterpart of a reduction in price which he grants to another unit which buys something from him (and which is the real beneficiary), so long as the discount is only granted to specific categories of purchasers. Recording in the accounts of the beneficiary results in a better distribution in the branch accounts and moreover greater stability of the national accounts in the face of minor institutional changes. The problem of allocation arises also for transfers designed to cover social risks or needs (illness, invalidism, old age, maternity). For this category of “social” goods and services for which general government wholly or partially assumes the costs to households, the transfer is treated either as a subsidy to collective consumption or a social benefit. The institutional arrangements, which vary from country to country, product to product and over time, give rise to profoundly different recording in the accounts. In order to restrict these differences, improve comparability between countries, permit analysis of trends over time, make the accounts less sensitive to different institutional arrangements and obtain a figure for household consumption which does not depend on the particular way in which the costs of such consumption is borne, the present document suggests that consumption subsidies should be treated as individual consumption expenditure of general government.     

Economic Analysis in Talmudic Literature: Some Ancient Studies of Value

A bstract . The Talmudic Sages displayed a remarkable understanding of economic laws and practices. A knowledge of this understanding would be useful for the development of western economic thought. Especially is this true of the insight these Jewish scholars won into the nature of value , one of the most controversial economic concepts today. The Talmud —a compilation of studies, disputations and interpretations from Palestinian and Babylonian academies from the 3rd century B.C.E. to the 5th century C.E.—contains a complex system of value concepts in which economic aspects are part of a larger set of ethical and legal doctrines. This includes "ideal" and "market value," the value of human life and its link to man's productive capacity, the derivation of present value from calculations of expected income flow from the person's labor, the nucleus of the concept of "human capital," of "free labor" as against "slave labor," subjective and objective value with the latter made subjective and the former objective, psychic value and marginal utility. The most intriguing doctrine is that of a "valueless value"; the Talmudic sages attempted the quantification of a negative value couched in positive and psycho-economic terms, an idea which, it is held, has no parallel in western economic thought. This idea, it is argued, has significance for modern welfare economics; it is a distinct category in which the valueless subject is given a positive numerical value (1) (2).     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

Durable goods with quality differentiation

We study the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist who can offer goods in different qualities. The key finding is that the presence of the additional sorting variable further undermines the firm's commitment problem, leading to results that contrast sharply with those of standard durable-goods models or those of models where the firm can commit.     

Loss aversion and the quantity–quality tradeoff

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from quality to quantity to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform managers of appropriate ways to structure contracts, and suggest benefits to personalizing contracts based on individual behavioral characteristics.