Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

Technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot versus Bertrand

This paper shows that the cost as well as the effectiveness of technology has a differential impact on technology adoption under two alternative modes of competition. If the cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the effectiveness of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the technology is low, Cournot competition fares better than Bertrand competition in terms of technology adoption by firms. This demonstrates that the commonly subscribed assumption of ‘positive primary outputs’ restricts (inflates) the scope of higher degree of technology adoption under Bertrand (Cournot) competition. Moreover, in contrast to standard welfare ranking, it shows that Cournot competition leads to higher social welfare than Bertrand competition under certain situations.     

Changing threat perceptions and the efficient provisioning of international security

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation, by an alliance of nations. This paper investigates how the evolution of public opinion, in the respective countries facing the rogue nation's threat, affects the mechanism. It also analyzes the impact of “fair‐weather friends” within the alliance, i.e., allies that increase support for security effort when the threat becomes less dangerous but withdraw support in more dangerous circumstances. Additionally, it explores how the possibility of sequential action by the allies, rather than simultaneous action, might affect joint security efforts.     

Economic Integration: Systemic Measures in an Input–Output Framework

Countries are linked through trade and for their mutual benefits they often group together. Consequently, trade blocs are formed in some form or another, examples of which are the EU, EFTA, ASEAN, NAFTA, and SAARC. Depending upon the form and the nature of the grouping, trade relations among countries obviously vary across the trade blocs. The pattern and the volume of trade of the participating countries are different and thus cause different impacts on the growth and development of the countries concerned. Also, the nature of integration changes over time. To examine the strength of integration within trade blocs, systemic measures of integration hitherto not available are formulated in an input–output framework. The measures are used, as a case study, to assess the inter-temporal variations in the degree of integration of SAARC.     

A three layer multi-item production–inventory model for multiple suppliers and retailers

The paper deals with a production inventory model for various types of items where multiple suppliers, a manufacturer and the multiple non-competing retailers are the members of the supply chain. In this model, each supplier supplies only one type of raw material to the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces a finished item by the combination of certain percentage of the various types of raw materials. The manufacturer produces also multi-items and delivers them according to the demand of the different retailers. Finally, an integrated profit of the supply chain is optimized by optimal ordering lot sizes of the raw materials. A numerical example is provided to justify the proposed model.     

A multi-echelon supply chain model for reworkable items in multiple-markets with supply disruption

The objective of this paper is to develop a multi-echelon supply chain model for multiple-markets with different selling seasons. Here, two suppliers are involved to supply the raw materials to the manufacturer where the main supplier may face supply disruption after a random time and the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive than the main supplier. In this article, the manufacturer produces a random proportion of defective items which are reworked after regular production and are sold in a lot to another market just after completion of rework. The retailer sells the finished products in different markets according to seasons. Finally, an integrated expected cost per unit product of the chain is minimized analytically by considering the lot-size ordered as a decision variable. An appropriate numerical example is also provided to justify the proposed model.     

Spatial Cournot Competition among Multi-Plant Firms in a Circular City

We characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi-plant Cournot oligopoly in a circular city. Previous work demonstrates that for a two-plant duopoly, all four plants are equally spaced. We establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants. In most other scenarios, multiple equilibria arise. Next, we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly. It is shown that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may not be unique, and for identical set-up costs, the firms may choose different numbers of plants.     

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.     

On the performance of endogenous access pricing

Endogenous access pricing (ENAP) is an alternative to the traditional procedure of setting a fixed access price that reflects the regulator’s estimate of the supplier’s average cost of providing access. Under ENAP, the access price reflects the supplier’s actual average cost of providing access, which varies with realized industry output. We show that in addition to eliminating the need to estimate industry output accurately and avoiding a divergence between upstream revenues and costs, ENAP can enhance the incentive of a vertically integrated producer to minimize its upstream operating cost. However, ENAP can sometimes discourage surplus-enhancing investment.