Economic Integration: Systemic Measures in an Input–Output Framework

Countries are linked through trade and for their mutual benefits they often group together. Consequently, trade blocs are formed in some form or another, examples of which are the EU, EFTA, ASEAN, NAFTA, and SAARC. Depending upon the form and the nature of the grouping, trade relations among countries obviously vary across the trade blocs. The pattern and the volume of trade of the participating countries are different and thus cause different impacts on the growth and development of the countries concerned. Also, the nature of integration changes over time. To examine the strength of integration within trade blocs, systemic measures of integration hitherto not available are formulated in an input–output framework. The measures are used, as a case study, to assess the inter-temporal variations in the degree of integration of SAARC.     

Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization

This paper investigates the effects of cross-ownership on optimal privatization, and vice-versa, in mixed duopoly. It shows that cross-ownership is profitable to the private firm only if the level of privatization of the public firm is sufficiently high. In equilibrium, cross-ownership does not take place even if there is partial privatization. However, the possibility of cross-ownership significantly limits the socially optimal level of privatization in most of the situations. Moreover, it demonstrates that full nationalization is socially optimal, in case of sufficiently convex identical cost functions and homogeneous goods. These results have strong implications to both divestment and competition policies.     

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.     

Foreign banks in the United States: Entry strategies and operations

This article deals with a very significant component of the U.S. banking industry: foreign banks in the United States. Their growth in the U.S., and specifically in California, is traced, as are the foci of their business strategy. In addition, the article explores the motivation of foreign banks to enter the U.S. market. All available theories are summarized and their relevance explored. The article goes on to speculate about some factors likely to influence the growth of foreign banking in the United States. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

On the performance of endogenous access pricing

Endogenous access pricing (ENAP) is an alternative to the traditional procedure of setting a fixed access price that reflects the regulator’s estimate of the supplier’s average cost of providing access. Under ENAP, the access price reflects the supplier’s actual average cost of providing access, which varies with realized industry output. We show that in addition to eliminating the need to estimate industry output accurately and avoiding a divergence between upstream revenues and costs, ENAP can enhance the incentive of a vertically integrated producer to minimize its upstream operating cost. However, ENAP can sometimes discourage surplus-enhancing investment.     

Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure: Impact on the Consumption of Indian Households

This paper examines whether out-of-pocket health expenditure affects the composition of household consumption. Based on Indian data, conditional Engel curves for 10 broad categories of goods and services, namely food, intoxicants, fuel, clothing and footwear, education, entertainment, travel, rent, durables and other goods have been estimated. Conditional Engel curves show whether the share of a particular good is increased or decreased in household consumption due to health expenditure. The findings suggest that poor households decrease the share of clothing and education and increase the share of food, fuel and travel. It has also been found that households from less developed states and from states with lower public health expenditure were more affected.     

Changing threat perceptions and the efficient provisioning of international security

This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to efficiently provision global security against the threat of a rogue nation, by an alliance of nations. This paper investigates how the evolution of public opinion, in the respective countries facing the rogue nation's threat, affects the mechanism. It also analyzes the impact of “fair‐weather friends” within the alliance, i.e., allies that increase support for security effort when the threat becomes less dangerous but withdraw support in more dangerous circumstances. Additionally, it explores how the possibility of sequential action by the allies, rather than simultaneous action, might affect joint security efforts.     

Real-world dosing and drug costs with everolimus or axitinib as second targeted therapies for advanced renal cell carcinoma: a retrospective chart review in the US

Objective:

To describe dosing patterns and to compare the drug costs per month spent in progression-free survival (PFS) among patients with advanced renal cell carcinoma (aRCC) treated with everolimus or axitinib following a first tyrosine kinase inhibitor (TKI).

Methods:

A medical record retrospective review was conducted among medical oncologists and hematologists/oncologists in the US. Patient eligibility criteria included: (1) age ≥18 years; (2) discontinuation of first TKI (sunitinib, sorafenib, or pazopanib) for medical reasons; (3) initiation of axitinib or everolimus as a second targeted therapy during February 2012–January 2013. Real-world dosing patterns were summarized. Dose-specific drug costs (as of October 2014) were based on wholesale acquisition costs from RED BOOK Online. PFS was compared between everolimus and axitinib using a multivariable Cox proportion hazards model. Everolimus and axitinib drug costs per month of PFS were compared using multivariable gamma regression models.

Results:

A total of 325 patients received everolimus and 127 patients received axitinib as second targeted therapy. Higher proportions of patients treated with axitinib vs everolimus started on a higher than label-recommended starting dose (14% vs 2%) or experienced dose escalation (11% vs 1%) on second targeted therapy. The PFS did not differ significantly between patients receiving everolimus or axitinib (adjusted hazard ratio (HR)?=?1.16; 95% confidence interval [CI]?=?0.73–1.82). After baseline characteristics adjustment, axitinib was associated with 17% ($1830) higher drug costs per month of PFS compared to everolimus ($12,467 vs $10,637; p?<?0.001).

Limitations:

Retrospective observational study design and only drug acquisition costs considered in drug costs estimates.

Conclusions:

Patients with aRCC receiving axitinib as second targeted therapy were more likely to initiate at a higher than label-recommended dose and were more likely to dose escalate than patients receiving everolimus. With similar observed durations of PFS, drug costs were significantly higher—by 17% per month of PFS—with axitinib than with everolimus.     

Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):443–459, 1982) where the workers’ reservation wage is the private information parameter critical for entry. We show that entry threat significantly distorts the wage, which in some cases adversely affects the firm’s ability to signal through price. Consequently, the separating equilibrium (in price) does not always exist. If, however, wage agreements are made public, signalling occurs with or without distortions in wage depending on whether the union’s bargaining power is high or low. Pooling equilibrium also exists and it features similar distortions. We also examine which signal, wage or price, generates greater social welfare. We would like to thank two referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is partially based on a chapter of Pal’s PhD thesis done at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India. For remaining errors we are solely responsible.