成功应用CRM的三大法宝

现实中,人们常常会因为对现有系统的不满而考虑采用一个CRM系统,但根据一份从2000年以来的客户调查结果显示,超过80%的CRM系统最初都没有经过周密的组织部署,只有少数行业如零售、医药和航空例外。许多公司由于缺乏资金、组织或兴趣,不得不采用渐进式地,自下而上的“游击式”CRM系统（gCRM）。在未来的三年内,成功的CRM战略将克服组织、渠道、价值、产品和技术的障碍,成为极具价值的客户管理系统。但是,这将依赖于IT经理是否对将要进行的CRM项目做战略计划。这里将介绍几种方法来推动CRM项目——虽然目前还没有完美的方…     

How Much of the Gender Difference in Child School Enrolment Can Be Explained? Evidence from Rural India

There are significant gender differences in child schooling in the Indian states though very few studies explain this gender difference. Unlike most existing studies we take account of the implicit and explicit opportunity costs of schooling and use a bivariate probit model to jointly determine a child's participation in school and market jobs. Results obtained from the World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER) villages in West Bengal suggest that indicators of household resources, parental preferences, returns to and opportunity costs of domestic work significantly affect child school enrolment. While household resources have similar effects on enrolment of boys and girls, other arguments tend to explain a part of the observed gender difference. Even after taking account of all possible arguments, there remains a large variation in gender differences in child schooling that cannot be explained by differences in male and female characteristics in our sample.     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.     

Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in?

This paper analyzes optimal strategies of an incumbent intermediary, who matches agents on the two sides of a market, in the presence of entry threat under alternative scenarios. It shows that, when entry is free, strategic entry accommodation is the optimal choice of the incumbent—not entry deterrence, unless the variation in agents' types is small. Entry accommodation remains optimal for the incumbent for a wide range of parametric configurations even when there is a fixed cost of entry. These results are in sharp contrast to the predictions of existing models of entry.     

Time-frequency dynamics of return spillover from crude oil to agricultural commodities

ABSTRACT

We explore return spillover from crude oil to ethanol, corn, soybean and wheat on daily data during 17 May 2005–27 June 2018. This study is unique in capturing the time-frequency dynamics of return spillover. We use the frequency-dependent spillover measure that jointly captures information from time and frequency domain. We also identify two endogenous break dates that segregate the study period in three sub-periods. Our results indicate that return spillover from crude oil to ethanol, major feed stocks (i.e. corn and soybean) and food crop (i.e. wheat) is pronounced only in lower frequency band or long-term (more than 1 month). We find that return spillover is stronger only during 2005–2010, i.e. the period of energy and food crisis.     

Sabotaging cost containment

We show that sabotage may be particularly profitable for a vertically-integrated provider (VIP) when its downstream rival can devote effort to reducing its operating costs. Demand-reducing sabotage limits the return the rival anticipates from its cost management activities, and thereby inhibits those activities. The resulting higher costs for the rival increase the VIP’s profit in settings where sabotage would not be profitable if the rival could not manage its operating costs. To limit sabotage by the VIP, the rival may find it profitable to intentionally diminish its ability to reduce its production costs. The diminished ability can produce Pareto gains.