Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams

We demonstrate the value of "equal pay" policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.     

IMPACT OF COMMUNIST PARTIES ON THE INDIVIDUAL DECISION TO JOIN A TRADE UNION: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

This paper analyzes the impact on individual decisions to unionize of several factors: the reach of communist parties, the degree of political activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics. The workers examined are Indian nonagricultural regular workers, using micro-data from the 2004–5 Employment and Unemployment Survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation, linked to state-level factors. A notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionization probability. Moreover, it seems that the mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionization to some extent. State-level political activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision to join a union. The paper concludes also that a worker's gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the determination of union membership.     

The impact of public ownership in the lending sector

We examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector, which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit. Such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects. For instance, it can increase lender profit. Furthermore, borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers’ projects. In addition, there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare.     

On the Performance of Linear Contracts

We examine the ability of linear contracts to replicate the performance of optimal unrestricted contracts in the canonical moral hazard setting with a wealth constrained, risk averse agent. We find that in a broad class of environments, the principal can always secure with a linear contract at least 95% of the profit that she secures with an optimal unrestricted contract, provided the productivity of the agent's effort is not too meager.     

Economic potential for improving the nutritional characteristics of feed grains

A comprehensive set of potential new feed grains for Australia was evaluated to help establish the options with the highest priorities for research. The cost–reducing impacts of the different options were analysed using a linear–programming model that determined the least–cost feed rations for the different livestock industries. Economic welfare analysis was then used to estimate the size and distribution of the benefits of research from the feed grains quality–improving research. The analysis revealed that there are only limited opportunities to improve the productivity and competitiveness of Australia's livestock industries by improving the nutritional characteristics of feed grains.     

A Stackelberg Oligopoly with Nonidentical Firms

This paper extends the Stackelberg model to include any number of nonidentical firms and demonstrates significant counterintuitive results. For example, entry of an additional firm may increase the quantities and/or profits of some existing firms; it may also increase the total industry profit.