Making competition in health care work

Health care reform in the United States is on a collision course with economic reality. Most proposals focus on measures that will produce one-time cost savings by eliminating waste and inefficiency. But the right question to ask is how to achieve dramatic and sustained cost reductions over time. What will it take to foster entirely new approaches to disease prevention and treatment, whole new ways to deliver services, and more cost-effective facilities? The answer lies in the powerful lessons business has learned over the past two decades about the imperatives of competition. In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition compels companies to deliver constantly increasing value to customers. The fundamental driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation. Without incentives to sustain innovation in health care, short-term cost savings will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything less than the best treatments available. The misguided assumption underlying much of the debate about health care is that technology is the enemy. By assuming that technology drives up costs, reformers neglect the central importance of innovation or, worse yet, attempt to slow its pace. In fact, innovation, driven by rigorous competition, is the key to successful reform.     

Pricing Reinsurance Contracts on FDIC Losses

This paper proposes a pricing model for the FDIC's reinsurance risk. We derive a closed‐form Weibull call option pricing model to price a call‐spread a reinsurer might sell to the FDIC. To obtain the risk‐neutral loss‐density necessary to price this call spread we risk‐neutralize a Weibull distributed FDIC annual losses by a tilting coefficient estimated from the traded call options on the BKX index. An application of the proposed approach yield reasonable reinsurance prices.     

Some generalized distributions based on Stacy's generalized gamma distribution

Abstract

The generalized gamma distribution having the density function was introduced by Stacy (1962), who studied some of its properties. As observed by Stacy, many standard distributions are special cases of (1). For example d=p=1 gives the exponential, p=1 gives the gamma p=1 and d=n/2 (n is a positive integer) gives the chi-squared, and d=p gives the Weibull distribution. Furthermore, certain functions of a normal variable— viz., its positive even powers, its modulus, and all positive powers of its modulus, have Stacy's gamma form.     

Measurement of Compensation: Union and Nonunion

For many purposes, the economic impact of unions is better measured by the proportion of union wages in total payrolls rather than by the proportion of unionized employees in the overall workforce. We use recently available Current Population Survey data to generate estimates of the former. We also show that published data from the Survey on median union and nonunion wages produce substantially larger estimates of the union 1 nonunion wage differential than figures based on mean wages. Finally, we note that the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment Cost Index gives undue weight to the union sector because of its Laspeyres methodology.     

The "perfect storm" in compensation: convergence of events leads to a greater need to review compensation strategies

The recent unprecedented convergence of significant strategic events in the compensation arena has created the need for ongoing and extensive compensation planning. This article reviews the events leading to this point, describes the implications of the results from a recent Aon study with WorldatWork, and suggests what employers can do to successfully navigate the "perfect storm" in compensation.