A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE RISK DISCLOSURE EMERGING FROM THE AGENDA FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

During the last decade an implicit conceptual framework for internal control and corporate risk management has arisen from risk management practice and policy within UK companies. An explicit conceptual framework for risk management is now emerging and is expressed in the Turnbull Report. In this paper, we develop a diagrammatic representation for the conceptual framework for internal control, risk management and risk disclosure. We consider the recent practical and policy developments in the disclosure of risk-related information in order to establish the current state of the art of corporate risk disclosure. Thus, we focus only on the disclosure aspect of the conceptual framework for internal control. We use a questionnaire survey to canvas the attitudes of UK institutional investors towards risk disclosure in relation to their portfolio investment decisions. Our empirical findings indicate that institutional investors do not generally favour a regulated environment for corporate risk disclosure or a general statement of business risk. The respondents agree that increased risk disclosure would help them in their portfolio investment decisions. However, for other aspects of the risk disclosure issue they are more neutral in attitude. Further, we found that the variation in the attitudes of institutional investors appears to be associated with the characteristics of the funds they manage as well as with their investment horizons. Further, we find that institutional investors’ perceptions of corporate governance are related to their investment horizons, among other factors.     

A Statistical Model of International Accounting Harmonization

This article shows how the difference between the observed frequencies of accounting policy choice and the outcome of a random policy choice, where each available method has an equal chance of being selected, may be fully explained with a statistical model. The process of harmonization is described in a way that identifies departures from equiprobable accounting policy choice as either: (a) the systematic effects of harmonization, or (b) the effects of systematic divergence from international harmony where the frequency of adoption of differing accounting methods varies across countries, or (c) the effects of company-specific accounting policy choices. The understanding of harmony that underlies previous attempts to measure harmonization is such that, with respect to a particular financial statement item, a situation of maximum harmony is reached when all companies in all countries use the same accounting method. From the standpoint of modelling the harmonization process. however, a different concept of harmony may be more useful. In this article, therefore, we posit a state of distributional harnzony in which, other things being equal, the expected distribution of accounting policy choices is the same in each country. In this theoretical state. the odds of selecting a given accounting method from those available for a particular financial statement item are identical for each country. A major advantage of this benchmark is that it provides a basis for distinguishing between two possibly conflicting components of the international harmonization process: between-country harmonization and within-country standardization. A hierarchy of nested statistical models is then used to describe accounting policy choices made by companies with an international shareholding and registered in Europe, where the European Union has been involved in a program of accounting harmonization. The accounting policies analysed in depth in this article comprise the treatment of goodwill and accounting for deferred taxation. The results are compared with the comparability index method used previously in harmonization research studies.     

Influence Costs and Capital Structure

This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.     

Why the Pound Should be Devalued Inside the ERM

I believe the choice of DM2.95 as a central rate for sterling's entry into the ERM was a major mistake of macroeconomic policy, on a par with monetary targeting and underestimatingtlle late 1980s' consumer-led boom. Indeed it was a belief that we were about to make this mistake that led me to undertake, with colleagues at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, a detailed and unique study of the choice facing policy makers. I shall have more to say on that study below. Shortly after entry I wrote: "The danger is that the government will attempt to defend the present exchange rate bands at all costs. As a result it may produce, or fail to prevent, a recession on the same scale as 1980-81. (Wren-Lewis, 1990, emphasis added). I fear that much of this has come to pass, but we still have a chance to retrieve something.
To propose a devaluation of sterling within the ERM requires three distinct arguments. The first is that we entered the ERM at a real exchange rate which was above a level required to produce a sustainable current account of the balance of payments. The second is that this matters, and in particular that it has prevented the government from taking steps to counteract the recession. The third is that the gains in adjusting, through a realignment, to a lower rate now outweigh the loss of credibility that would be involved. I shall consider each point in turn.¹