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91.
We develop a two‐country Cournot oligopoly model with product differentiation across countries and production‐generated pollution. The abatement of pollution by the firms in response to emission taxes is endogenous, and the number of firms can be fixed or there may be free entry and exit of firms in both countries. We propose particular unilateral and multilateral piecemeal policy reforms of emission taxes and production subsidies such that domestic industries will not suffer any loss of international competitiveness (defined in terms of either market share or profits), emission levels will be lower, and welfare could be higher in both countries. 相似文献
92.
Nuray Aykin Apala Lahiri Chavan Susan M. Dray Girish Prabhu 《Marketing Review St. Gallen》2012,29(3):4-7
INTERVIEW
? Emerging markets are becoming core business for multinationals ? 相似文献93.
94.
This paper shows that under imperfect competition, the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization may depend crucially on whether taxes are levied by the destination or the origin principle. In a standard model of imperfect competition, while harmonization always makes at least one country better off, and may be Pareto-improving, when taxes are levied under the destination principle (which currently applies in the European Union), harmonization of origin-based taxes (as recently proposed by the European Commission) is certain to be Pareto-worsening when the preferences in the two countries are identical, and is likely to be so even when they differ. 相似文献
95.
Cross-Border Pollution,Terms of Trade,and Welfare 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Panos Hatzipanayotou Sajal Lahiri Michael S. Michael 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,41(3):327-345
We construct a two-good general equilibrium model of international trade for two small open economies where pollution from
production is transmitted across borders. Governments in both countries impose emission taxes non-cooperatively. Within this
framework, we examine the effect of changes in the degree of cross-border pollution on Nash emission taxes, emission levels
and welfare. We do so under two scenarios: when changes in cross-border pollution do not affect domestic pollution (non-strategic)
and when they do (strategic). We also examine the effect of changes in international terms of trade on pollution and welfare
when cross-border pollution is non-strategic.
相似文献
96.
Somdeb Lahiri 《Review of Economic Design》2007,10(4):327-339
We show that the core is non-empty and coincides with the set of competitive equilibria for an assembled product industry.
This paper was written while the author was affiliated with the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of Witwatersrand
at Johannesburg. 相似文献
97.
This paper analyzes the relationship between market shares and welfare under the assumption of Cournot-oligopolistic interdependence in production. The model is general enough to deal with multiple countries, oligopolists with different levels of marginal costs within each country, and any distribution of world demand across countries. It is found that the elimination of a minor firm harms the country if the country's total production is very little. However, such a policy always benefits the country if it exports the commodity. The welfare effect of production subsidies and the case of foreign ownership of firms are also discussed. 相似文献
98.
99.
We compare the effects of an emission tax, and those of a relative emission standard, on welfare and pollution levels under
oligopolistic market structures. We consider the cases where the number of firms is fixed and where there is free entry and
exit of firms. When the number of firms is fixed, (i) a relative emission standard is welfare-superior to an emission-equivalent
emission tax, and (ii) an emission tax is emission-superior to a welfare-equivalent relative emission standard. Under free
entry and exit, the results are just the opposite when the inverse demand function is concave. 相似文献
100.