首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   120篇
  免费   4篇
财政金融   8篇
工业经济   5篇
计划管理   17篇
经济学   71篇
贸易经济   16篇
农业经济   1篇
经济概况   6篇
  2021年   1篇
  2020年   1篇
  2019年   1篇
  2018年   1篇
  2017年   3篇
  2016年   3篇
  2015年   1篇
  2014年   2篇
  2013年   8篇
  2012年   8篇
  2011年   6篇
  2010年   4篇
  2009年   5篇
  2008年   5篇
  2007年   10篇
  2006年   7篇
  2005年   5篇
  2004年   4篇
  2003年   1篇
  2002年   3篇
  2001年   1篇
  2000年   4篇
  1999年   2篇
  1998年   4篇
  1997年   4篇
  1996年   2篇
  1994年   2篇
  1993年   1篇
  1992年   1篇
  1989年   1篇
  1988年   1篇
  1986年   3篇
  1984年   3篇
  1983年   4篇
  1981年   5篇
  1980年   2篇
  1979年   3篇
  1978年   1篇
  1977年   1篇
排序方式: 共有124条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
91.
We develop a two‐country Cournot oligopoly model with product differentiation across countries and production‐generated pollution. The abatement of pollution by the firms in response to emission taxes is endogenous, and the number of firms can be fixed or there may be free entry and exit of firms in both countries. We propose particular unilateral and multilateral piecemeal policy reforms of emission taxes and production subsidies such that domestic industries will not suffer any loss of international competitiveness (defined in terms of either market share or profits), emission levels will be lower, and welfare could be higher in both countries.  相似文献   
92.
93.
94.
This paper shows that under imperfect competition, the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization may depend crucially on whether taxes are levied by the destination or the origin principle. In a standard model of imperfect competition, while harmonization always makes at least one country better off, and may be Pareto-improving, when taxes are levied under the destination principle (which currently applies in the European Union), harmonization of origin-based taxes (as recently proposed by the European Commission) is certain to be Pareto-worsening when the preferences in the two countries are identical, and is likely to be so even when they differ.  相似文献   
95.
Cross-Border Pollution,Terms of Trade,and Welfare   总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1  
We construct a two-good general equilibrium model of international trade for two small open economies where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Governments in both countries impose emission taxes non-cooperatively. Within this framework, we examine the effect of changes in the degree of cross-border pollution on Nash emission taxes, emission levels and welfare. We do so under two scenarios: when changes in cross-border pollution do not affect domestic pollution (non-strategic) and when they do (strategic). We also examine the effect of changes in international terms of trade on pollution and welfare when cross-border pollution is non-strategic.   相似文献   
96.
We show that the core is non-empty and coincides with the set of competitive equilibria for an assembled product industry. This paper was written while the author was affiliated with the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of Witwatersrand at Johannesburg.  相似文献   
97.
This paper analyzes the relationship between market shares and welfare under the assumption of Cournot-oligopolistic interdependence in production. The model is general enough to deal with multiple countries, oligopolists with different levels of marginal costs within each country, and any distribution of world demand across countries. It is found that the elimination of a minor firm harms the country if the country's total production is very little. However, such a policy always benefits the country if it exports the commodity. The welfare effect of production subsidies and the case of foreign ownership of firms are also discussed.  相似文献   
98.
99.
We compare the effects of an emission tax, and those of a relative emission standard, on welfare and pollution levels under oligopolistic market structures. We consider the cases where the number of firms is fixed and where there is free entry and exit of firms. When the number of firms is fixed, (i) a relative emission standard is welfare-superior to an emission-equivalent emission tax, and (ii) an emission tax is emission-superior to a welfare-equivalent relative emission standard. Under free entry and exit, the results are just the opposite when the inverse demand function is concave.  相似文献   
100.
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号