Selection by committee: Anonymity and gratitude

What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a committee to measure the candidates’ ability and select a winner? We find that if the committee takes into account the candidate’s gratitude towards them, a candidate with less than first best ability will be selected. A relevant exception may occur if the first best is the overall best candidate. First best selection is always achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee is not detached enough from the candidates then delegation fares even worse than random selection.     

Cost-effectiveness analysis of mechanical thrombectomy with stent retriever in the treatment of acute ischemic stroke in Italy

Background: Stroke has a significant disease burden in terms of acute and long-term disability in Italy and throughout the world. Endovascular treatments for the management of a stroke event have been coupled in the past years with the possibility to mechanically remove the occlusion by means of specially designed thrombectomy devices, and their exclusive use showed levels of effectiveness in line with those of the existing pharmacological treatments.

Objective: To assess the cost-effectiveness of mechanical thrombectomy (MT) with the Solitaire Revascularization Device (stent retriever) for the treatment of acute ischemic stroke (AIS) in patients with large vessel occlusions (LVOs), comparing MT plus intravenous tissue plasminogen activation (MT plus IV t-PA) vs IV t-PA alone, in Italy.

Methods: A Markov model was used to simulate costs and benefits of MT plus IV t-PA and IV t-PA alone over a 5-year time horizon and considering the perspective of the Italian National Health Service (NHS). Results are reported in terms of Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER). Deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analyses are carried out in order to test the robustness of the results.

Results: Total costs of MT plus IV t-PA and IV t-PA alone are equal to €31,798 and €34,855, respectively. The MT allows incremental QALYs for 0.77, determining a dominant ICER. The utilities associated to the mRS health states are the parameters with the highest impact on the results. Multiway sensitivity analyses determined a 90% probability of dominance.

Conclusions: MT plus IV t-PA for AIS patients with LVO is cost-effective from year 1 through year 3, and cost-saving from year 4 onward in the Italian context, achieving better results, both in terms of efficacy and in terms of resource consumption.     

The role of agricultural cooperatives in sustaining the wheat diversity and productivity: the case of southern Italy

We hypothesize that institutions such as agricultural cooperatives influence regional levels of variety diversity through input supply, processing or marketing functions. This diversity can also affect yield, a partial measure of crop productivity. We test these hypotheses with data from southern Italy, a mega-diversity spot and centre of diversity for durum wheat. Cooperatives in the southern regions of Italy process farmers’ harvests of durum wheat into bread, label it, and sell it locally. In this relatively marginalized region of the country, cooperatives enable farmers to capture more of the value of the final product and reduce marketing costs. To test the hypothesis, we apply a two-stage estimation approach with a Cobb-Douglas production function and panel data analysis. Findings suggest that the density of cooperatives in a region is associated with greater spatial diversity in wheat varieties grown, and that, over a 14-year period, this diversity positively affected crop yields.     

Environment, human development and economic growth

Over the last few years, environmental issues have entered into policy design, particularly development and growth policies. Natural resources are considered necessary production inputs and environmental quality is considered a welfare determinant. The integration of environmental issues into economic growth and development theories and empirics is currently widely analyzed in the literature. The effects of natural resources endowment on economic growth are mainly analyzed through the so-called Resource Curse Hypothesis (RCH) whereas the effects of economic growth on environmental quality are part of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Furthermore, recent contributions on RCH and EKC have shown the important role of institutions and human development dimensions in building a sustainable development path. In this paper, we attempt to analyze the causal relationships between economic growth, human development and sustainability combining the RCH and EKC models and adopting a human development perspective. Results confirm the importance of high institutional quality and investments for human capital accumulation in order to build a sustainable development path.     

A theoretical and empirical evaluation and extension of the Todaro migration model

"This paper postulates that it is theoretically and empirically preferable to base internal labor migration on the relative difference in rural-urban real income streams and rates of unemployment, taken as separate and independent variables, rather than on the difference in the expected real income streams as postulated by the very influential and often quoted Todaro model. The paper goes on to specify several important ways of extending the resulting migration model and improving its empirical performance." The analysis is based on Italian data.     

Selling information to competitive firms

Internal agency conflicts distort firms' choices and reduce social welfare. To limit these distortions, principals dealing with privately informed agents often acquire information from specialized intermediaries, such as auditing and certification companies, that are able to ascertain, and credibly disclose, agents' private information. We study how the structures of both the information provision and the final good markets affect information accuracy. A monopolistic information provider may supply imprecise information to perfectly competitive firms, even if the precision of this information can be increased at no cost. This is due to a price effect of information: although more accurate information reduces agency costs and allows firms to increase production, it also results in a lower price in the final good market, which reduces principals' willingness to pay for information.