INTERNATIONAL LISTINGS, THE SECURITY MARKET LINE AND CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF US LISTINGS ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE

This paper examines for international capital market segmentation by testing for changes (both inter-temporally and inter-beta) in the parameters of the riskreturn pricing relationship caused by the listing of US stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 1965 and 1987. It is hypothesized that international listings reduce the negative effects associated with barriers to international investments, help integrate world markets and therefore decrease internationally listed stock's required returns. Significant negative deviations from the Sharpe-Lintner (SL) pre-listing pricing relationship during the postlisting period are therefore expected, primarily caused by decreases in the intercept parameter. We find, in support of the hypothesis, significant negative deviations from the predictions of SL for our sample, although they do not appear to have an intertemporal dimension. These deviations are largely associated both with decreases in the value of the SL model's intercept parameter and with low beta firms, and point toward some integration benefits from US listings on the LSE.     

遗失物拾得人报酬请求权及标准研究

新颁布的物权法规定了遗失物拾得制度,虽然立法者并没有按照国际惯例在物权法中充分肯定所有遗失物拾得人报酬请求权,然而通过一些调查分析,我们发现这与我们的国情又是相符的。看来,对所有遗失物拾得人报酬请求权的肯定还要循序渐进。     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

故居民风千年根

春节前后，我偶然来到泰山脚下新泰市的大寺村——一个平凡而简单的小山村。走近村里一堵堵青青白白的石砌墙，一座座茅草覆顶的旧门楼，看到狗儿、猫儿、行人，安闲的在胡同里青石板上踱步，直觉得好像从陶渊明的诗句里跑出来的影像一般。家家户户的大门上贴着鲜艳的对联、门神、五彩的门笺。孩子们放鞭炮、捉迷藏；83岁的张老太和小孙子推起碾子，洒下一串欢笑     

Modeling technical progress and total factor productivity: A plant level example

Shifts in the production frontier occur because of changes in technology. A model of how a firm learns to use the new technology, or how it adapts from the first production frontier to the second, is suggested. Two different adaptation paths are embodied in a translog cost function and its attendant cost share equations. The paths are the traditional linear time trend and a learning curve. The model is estimated using establishment level data from a non-regulated industry that underwent a technological shift in the time period covered by the data. The learning curve resulted in more plausible estimates of technical progress and total factor productivity growth patterns. A significant finding is that, at the establishment level, all inputs appear to be substitutes.This paper was processed by N.R. Adam.     

用先进文化推动先进生产力的发展

文化是人类独有的生存方式，是一个民族的精神记忆，是综合国力的重要体现，先进文化是民族精神的火炬，是鼓舞人民前进的号角。代表先进生产力的发展要求，必须以先进文化作支撑。没有先进文化的强力支撑，推动先进生产力发展，便会成为无源之水，无本之木。因此，大力加强先进文化建设，特别是企业文化建设，是企业实现超常规，     

芡扬高原精神 做好金融服务——访中国建设锻行黢份有限公司青海省分行行长张柏良

青海省位于青藏高原东北部．东西长约1200公里，南北宽800公里．面积为72万平方公里。     

The Relation Among Targets' R&D Activities, Acquirers' Returns, and In-Process R&D in the US

Abstract:  Using a sample of 129 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US between publicly traded acquirers and targets in research and development (R&D) intensive industries over the period of 1994-2004 and a size- and industry-matched sample, we examine the relation among targets' R&D activities, the probability of acquirers' writing-off in-process R&D (IPRD), and acquirers' returns around the time of M&A announcements. We find that firms acquiring targets with higher R&D investments tend to write off some of the acquired R&D assets upon the completion of the M&As. We also find that the median cumulative abnormal return during the three days around M&A announcements for acquirers with subsequent IPRD write-offs is −2.73% while the return for acquirers without IPRD write-offs is −0.60%. This suggests that acquirers' stock returns around M&A announcements are much lower when investors expect acquirers to expense IPRD. The results are consistent with our conjecture that acquirers tend to write-off IPRD when they acquire overvalued targets. We also find that IPRD write-offs do not increase earnings or stock returns of acquirers after M&As, which is inconsistent with an earnings management hypothesis.