Managerial Reaction to Takeover Bids: A Theory of Strategic Resistance

This paper develops a theory to explain the frequently observed resistance offered by the management of target firms to high-premium takeover bids. Contrary to the popular perception of managerial entrenchment at the expense of the shareholders' interests, such resistance may be strategically designed to increase shareholder wealth by threatening to initiate an informal auction process fur the target involving other potential bidders. Remarkably, this strategy can be effective even when it is common knowledge that the other bidders do not have a higher reservation price for the target. The analysis also offers insights into division of takeover gains and several other takeover-related issues.     

On estimating the reliability after sequentially estimating the mean: The exponential case

Sequential estimation problems for the mean parameter of an exponential distribution has received much attention over the years. Purely sequential and accelerated sequential estimators and their asymptotic second-order characteristics have been laid out in the existing literature, both for minimum risk point as well as bounded length confidence interval estimation of the mean parameter. Having obtained a data set from such sequentially designed experiments, the paper investigates estimation problems for the associatedreliability function. Second-order approximations are provided for the bias and mean squared error of the proposed estimator of the reliability function, first under a general setup. An ad hoc bias-corrected version is also introduced. Then, the proposed estimator is investigated further under some specific sequential sampling strategies, already available in the literature. In the end, simulation results are presented for comparing the proposed estimators of the reliability function for moderate sample sizes and various sequential sampling strategies.     

Existence of Unsolicited Ratings

Rating agencies provide unsolicited ratings voluntarily without the borrowers’ consent. Therefore, the agencies do not get paid for this service. While, supporters of unsolicited ratings argue that voluntary disclosure is done to build reputation, those opposing this practice argue that this leads to financial blackmail. In this paper, we build a model that addresses these issues. We identify the scenarios where rating agencies will provide unsolicited ratings. Finally, we find the welfare effect of unsolicited ratings and suggest policy implications.      

Reporting Discretion and Private Information Communication through Earnings

We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms.     

International market selection and subsidiary performance: A neural network approach

How should multinational enterprises (MNEs) select international markets? We develop a model of international market selection that adds firm-specific advantages and transaction cost considerations to previously explored target market factors based on Dunning's Eclectic Framework. Results obtained using neural network (NN) analysis indicates that our model has strong predictive power in explaining international market selection. Further tests show that firms selecting international markets predicted by the model reported significantly higher subsidiary performance relative to firms whose investments were not predicted by the model. Our results provide strong initial evidence that a firm-level strategic approach to international market selection facilitates MNE success.     

Economic and environmental impacts of trade liberalization: The case of Indonesia

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the environmental impacts of trade liberalization. This paper provides further discourse in this area with a study on Indonesia and its trade agreements with Japan (IJEPA) and ASEAN (AFTA). A static global CGE model, known as the Global Trade Analysis Project, was used to project the Indonesian economy to the year 2022, with and without tariff reforms agreed under the agreements. Environmental impacts are assessed using different pollution indicators—air, water and waste. The study suggests that Indonesia would grow rapidly over the period considered with a large deterioration in its environment. Following these, however, the agreements only have a marginal positive impact on Indonesia's output but with a noticeable increase in trade flows and signs of trade diversion. Overall AFTA has a greater impact on the Indonesian economy compared to IJEPA. Similarly, the impact of trade liberalization on the environment is marginal. On the whole, tariff reform is inducing air pollution and reducing water pollution. In conclusion, the study suggests that Indonesia's participation in the AFTA and IJEPA agreements is not likely to bring drastic changes to her economic and environmental performance.     

Strengthening Stakeholder–Company Relationships Through Mutually Beneficial Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) continues to gain attention atop the corporate agenda and is by now an important component of the dialogue between companies and their stakeholders. Nevertheless, there is still little guidance as to how companies can implement CSR activity in order to maximize returns to CSR investment. Theorists have identified many company-favoring outcomes of CSR; yet there is a dearth of research on the psychological mechanisms that drive stakeholder responses to CSR activity. Borrowing from the literatures on means-end chains and relationship marketing, we propose a conceptual model that explains how CSR provides individual stakeholders with numerous benefits (functional, psychosocial, and values) and how the type and extent to which a stakeholder derives these benefits from CSR initiatives influences the quality of the relationship between the stakeholder and the company. The paper discusses the implications of these␣insights and highlights a number of areas for future research.     

Correction: Abductive Inference and C. S. Peirce: 150 Years Later

Journal of Quantitative Economics -