Failed takeover attempts,corporate governance and refocusing

Hostile takeover attempts oftentimes signal that a target firm has an over‐diversified and ineffective corporate strategy. What does this signal mean when takeover attempts fail? Drawing from agency theory, we argue that target firms managed by independent directory boards are likely to ignore the takeover attempt and not refocus their firms' strategy. Conversely, target firms managed by nonindependent boards are more likely to view the failed takeover attempt as a ‘wake‐up call’ and will refocus their firms' strategy so as to preserve the firm's survival. These arguments are tested using a sample of 76 firms that were targets of failed hostile takeover attempts. Logistic regression analyses confirm the predictions. This study suggests that in the aftermath of a failed takeover attempt board of director characteristics can help predict changes in corporate strategies. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic optimization with a nonsmooth, nonconvex technology: the case of a linear objective function

This paper studies a one-sector optimal growth model with linear utility in which the production function is only required to be increasing and upper semicontinuous. The model also allows for a general form of irreversible investment. We show that every optimal capital path is strictly monotone until it reaches a steady state; further, it either converges to zero, or reaches a positive steady state in finite time and possibly jumps among different steady states afterwards. We establish conditions for extinction (convergence to zero), survival (boundedness away from zero), and the existence of a critical capital stock below which extinction is possible and above which survival is ensured. These conditions generalize those known for the case of S-shaped production functions. We also show that as the discount factor approaches one, optimal paths converge to a small neighborhood of the capital stock that maximizes sustainable consumption.This paper is dedicated to Professor Mukul Majumdar on his 60th birthday. His research with various co-authors in the late 70s and the 80s pioneered innovative techniques for the analysis of nonconvex dynamic optimization models – both deterministic and stochastic. Roy considers himself particularly fortunate for having had the opportunity to learn economic theory and mathematical economics from Professor Majumdar. This paper has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions by an anonymous referee. Financial support from the 21st Century COE Program at GSE and RIEB, Kobe University, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Growth in India’s Service Sector: Implications of Structural Breaks

The paper is an attempt to identify the multiple structural breaks in India’s GDP, as well as its main growth enhancing sector i.e., services and its components and subsequently calculate the growth rate in different regimes. The paper uses the Bai-Perron (Econom 66(1), 1998, J Appl Econom 18(1), 2003) methodology of estimating multiple endogenous structural breaks (both pure and partial) in India’s service sector and its components and GDP during 1950–2010. Further, the paper uses the Boyce (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 48:385–391, 1986) methodology of estimating kinked exponential model of the growth rate, and further uses the Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock (J Business Econ Stat 10:271–287, 1992) test and the Lumsdaine and Pappel (Rev Econ Stat 79:212–218, 1997) test to check for the stationarity in the presence of structural breaks. The data used in this paper are the components of subsectors of services GDP and GDP at factor cost (with 2004–2005 as base). It is found that there is very little difference between the estimation of pure and partial structural break dates in India’s services GDP and its subsectors and four such breaks have been identified with help of Bai-Perron (Econom 66(1), 1998, J Appl Econom 18(1), 2003) methodology. The Boyce methodology of estimation of growth rates finds that mainly in the third and fourth regimes, the growth rates are highest in the subsectoral as well as at the aggregate levels of services GDP. The Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock test (J Business Econ Stat 10:271–287, 1992) and the extended Lumsdaine and Pappel test (Rev Econ Stat 79:212–218, 1997) cannot negate the presence of unit root in the data, irrespective of the presence of multiple structural breaks. The paper concludes with the identification of four broad regimes of growth of India’s services GDP and in the subsectors with possible explanations thereof.

     

Paying the expected externality for a price quote achieves bargaining efficiency

A seller and buyer have reservation prices x and y. Each has a subjective distribution on the other's reservation price. Paying an offer or the expected benefit the other participant receives from his offer induces honest price quotations, hence efficiency: sale iff y> x.     

Controlling a biological invasion: a non-classical dynamic economic model

This paper analyzes the optimal intertemporal control of a biological invasion. The invasion growth function is non-convex and control costs depend on the invasion size, resulting in a non-classical dynamic optimization problem. We characterize the long run dynamic behavior of an optimally controlled invasion and the corresponding implications for public policy. Both control and the next-period invasion size may be non-monotone functions of the current invasion size; the related optimal time paths may not be monotone or convergent. We provide conditions under which eradication, maintenance control, and no control are optimal policies.      

Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital

When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest in the initial period, and leads to loss of tax revenue. This dynamic inconsistency problem is resolved if the host government commits to non-preferential taxation in each period even if it does not commit to future tax rates.