Cross-hedging foreign currency risk: Empirical evidence from an error correction model

In this article, the traditional price change hedge ratio estimation method is extended by applying the theory of cointegration in the case of cross-hedging of spot exchange risk of the Belgian franc (BF), the Italian lira (IL), and the Dutch guilder (NG) with U.S. Dollar Index futures contracts. Previous studies ignore the last period's equilibrium error and short-run deviations. The findings of this study indicate that the hedge ratio estimated by the error correction method is superior to that obtained from the traditional method, as evidenced by the likelihood ratio test and out-of-sample forecasts. Hedgers will be able to control the risk of their portfolios more effectively at a lower cost.     

On the Determinants of REIT Capital Structure: Evidence from around the World

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Using a sample of REITs from twelve countries around the world, we examine the determinants of REIT capital structure. We investigate...     

Pecking order as a dynamic leverage theory

Static tradeoff theories, which do not explicitly treat the impact of transaction costs, do not explain the policy of asymmetry between frequent small debt transactions and infrequent large equity transactions. Nor do these theories explain why the debt ratio is allowed to wander a considerable distance from its alleged static optimum, or how much of a distance should be tolerated. We offer a class of diffusion models that mimic this behaviour in a stochastic-dynamic framework and are designed to optimize a financing strategy using any static tradeoff theory as input. The models developed reveal the determinants of the size and frequency of equity transactions and the range of values over which leverage variations are tolerated in four generic scenarios. They also yield a new formulation of the cost of capital that recognizes stochastic transaction costs and a penalty for deviation from any static-optimal leverage. Our class of models augments the pecking order theory, provides a flexible quantitative framework for its implementation as a decision tool, and facilitates the formulation of additional hypotheses for its empirical validation. Symmetrically, our results show the importance of dynamic factors in designing and interpreting empirical tests of static tradeoff theories. The results presented have important implications for the role played by static tradeoff theories in a stochastic-dynamic framework. One such implication is that the static-optimal leverage has no direct effect on the firm's leverage policy in this setting. The target leverage for refinancing transactions is different from the static-optimal leverage, and the mean leverage is generally different from both. As a consequence, the latter cannot be used to estimate the former. Another implication is that even when the mean leverage equals the static optimum, mean reversion is not an optimal behaviour and therefore not a legitimate test for the existence of a static tradeoff in a dynamic context. Still another implication is that wide variations in leverage ratios cannot be interpreted as evidence of leverage indifference. It follows that the pecking order theory is consistent with static tradeoff theories and does not require the assumption of leverage indifference.     

Investor Protection,Investment Efficiency and Value: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

We examine the impact of improved investor protection due to cross‐listing on foreign firms’ investment decisions and firm value. While we find that cross‐listing increases firms’ capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions activities, cross‐listed firms also invest more in research and development, make better acquisition decisions, and have higher profitability compared to non‐cross‐listed firms. Moreover, cross‐listing is associated with better cash utilization by foreign firms for investments. These improvements in investments and cash utilization are more pronounced for firms cross‐listed on US exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor protection laws.     

Platform Sharing in a Differentiated Duopoly

Platform sharing across manufacturers has become common practice in the automobile industry. Although platform sharing reduces the degree of product differentiation, manufacturers can reduce their procurement costs by taking advantage of the commonality of components. We investigate this trade-off through analyzing a model that incorporates manufacturer–supplier relationships into a differentiated duopoly model, and find an interesting inverse relationship between the advantage of platform sharing and manufacturers' costs to communicate with their potential suppliers. We also explore welfare consequences of the Internet trading exchanges by considering an extension that allows the manufacturers to jointly establish a business-to-business electronic marketplace.     

On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market

In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity Stackelberg games, provide some new results with price Stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games. In the price Stackelberg game we show there is a unique SPNE where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs. We prove that generally quantity Stackelberg games are less competitive than price Stackelberg games. However, we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result.     

Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non‐whites/non‐Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non‐whites/non‐Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.     

International trade and unionization: Evidence from India

We exploit exogenous variation in tariffs to examine the impact of import competition on unionization and union wages in a developing country. Using a combination of nationally representative household data (National Sample Survey Organization) and nationally representative industry‐level data (Annual Survey of Industries) from India, we find that net‐import industries that experienced larger cuts in tariffs also experienced larger declines in unionization. In addition, we find that these industries also experienced larger increases in union wages. These results are consistent with the predictions of an efficient bargaining framework that we extend to endogenize the union formation decision by allowing for a fixed cost of union formation. We also conduct a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation to show that the total wage gains to unionized workers marginally exceed the total wage losses to deunionized workers.     

Depositor Discipline in the Banking Sector in India: An Empirical Investigation

Journal of Quantitative Economics - The paper traces the determinants of depositor discipline in Indian banking. Using annual data on commercial banks covering the period 1996 to 2003, the findings...     

Bertrand equilibrium with subadditive costs

We show here, in contrast to recent results, that if firms have different cost functions (that are strictly subadditive), such that the ‘monopoly breakeven prices’ are different, then in a homogeneous product duopoly there is always a Bertrand equilibrium (either in pure strategies or in mixed strategies).