全文获取类型
收费全文 | 7494篇 |
免费 | 449篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 994篇 |
工业经济 | 315篇 |
计划管理 | 1465篇 |
经济学 | 2290篇 |
综合类 | 53篇 |
运输经济 | 153篇 |
旅游经济 | 159篇 |
贸易经济 | 1743篇 |
农业经济 | 254篇 |
经济概况 | 509篇 |
邮电经济 | 8篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 9篇 |
2023年 | 126篇 |
2022年 | 103篇 |
2021年 | 140篇 |
2020年 | 253篇 |
2019年 | 321篇 |
2018年 | 502篇 |
2017年 | 579篇 |
2016年 | 485篇 |
2015年 | 257篇 |
2014年 | 359篇 |
2013年 | 1290篇 |
2012年 | 412篇 |
2011年 | 380篇 |
2010年 | 373篇 |
2009年 | 324篇 |
2008年 | 273篇 |
2007年 | 203篇 |
2006年 | 200篇 |
2005年 | 191篇 |
2004年 | 125篇 |
2003年 | 133篇 |
2002年 | 116篇 |
2001年 | 84篇 |
2000年 | 61篇 |
1999年 | 54篇 |
1998年 | 73篇 |
1997年 | 44篇 |
1996年 | 31篇 |
1995年 | 27篇 |
1994年 | 28篇 |
1993年 | 20篇 |
1992年 | 21篇 |
1991年 | 24篇 |
1990年 | 12篇 |
1989年 | 21篇 |
1988年 | 10篇 |
1987年 | 9篇 |
1986年 | 9篇 |
1985年 | 23篇 |
1984年 | 22篇 |
1983年 | 20篇 |
1982年 | 20篇 |
1981年 | 15篇 |
1980年 | 12篇 |
1979年 | 6篇 |
1978年 | 10篇 |
1976年 | 8篇 |
1974年 | 14篇 |
1969年 | 7篇 |
排序方式: 共有7943条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
81.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
82.
Anne-Sophie Crépin 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,26(4):625-646
Recent research in natural sciences shows that the dynamics in boreal forests are much more complex than what many models
traditionally used in forestry economics reflect. This essay analyzes some challenges of accounting for such complexity. It
shows that the optimal harvesting strategy for forest owners is history dependent and for some states of the forest, more
than one strategy may be optimal.This paper confirms earlier literature on shallow lakes and coral reefs and shows that this
kind of phenomena seem much more common than previously thought. They are valid for a wide range of ecosystems that cover
large surfaces and they do not depend on the choice of some specific function to model the non-linearity. There are also indications
that theses results could be obtained even for resources with concave growth if at least one species with non-linear growth
affects their dynamics. 相似文献
83.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
84.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
85.
86.
Welfare reducing licensing 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous. 相似文献
87.
János Gács 《Empirica》1994,21(1):83-104
The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget. 相似文献
88.
Ricardo De O. Cavalcanti Andrs Erosa Ted Temzelides 《International Economic Review》2005,46(2):675-706
We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure. 相似文献
89.
AbstractThis paper contributes to the empirical research around the “wage-led” or “profit-led” demand regimes. It first reviews how Kalecki, and then Steindl, approached the relationship between economic growth and income distribution. Then, empirical analysis carried out under the probabilistic approach to econometric modeling shows statistical evidence, estimated through cointegration analysis, that in the long run, in three very open economies—Mexico, France, and Korea—the wage share is positively associated with demand and output. It finally discusses the macroeconomic dilemma that almost all countries have to face, i.e., a positive effect of a high-wage policy on demand and employment may diverge from a negative effect on output compatible with external equilibrium. 相似文献
90.
Frédéric Lordon 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):1-21
The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies,
and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing
that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn
“productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path.
Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by
the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as
long term and endogenous outcomes. 相似文献