The Role of Language in the Communication Process Between Business and Government: Evidence from Russian Firms

Abstract

The paper investigates how language facilitates communication process between government and business. We use Russian context to show barriers and challenges of using language in official communication between governmental authorities and Russian companies. In our work, we demonstrate how language may produce employee’s misunderstanding and discuss typical sources of ineffective usage of language. The results indicate that problematic issues of both linguistic and non-linguistic nature can lead to serious implications for successful communication between government and business in Russia. We found that documentations’ complexity, which is perceived as such due to a complicated subject area they belong to (legal, tax, etc.) and language insufficiency applied are most likely to raise multiple problems related to government’s communication with business.     

Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns

There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for “display” advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a $${\$}25$$  billion business annually. The present study derives a method of pricing such advertisements based on their relative scarcity while ensuring that all campaigns obtain a reasonably representative sample of the relevant opportunities. The mechanism is well-behaved under supply uncertainty. A method based on the mechanism described in this paper was implemented by Yahoo! Inc.     

Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms’ growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.     

The nature of the foreign listing premium: A cross-country examination

An expanding literature asserts that non-US firms achieve a unique valuation premium for listing on US equity markets. In this paper we test the uniqueness of the US foreign listing premium by examining the premium achieved by foreign listings across a global set of stock exchanges. We highlight that the documented valuation premium for listing on US exchanges is not unique but common to many home and host markets including US firms that list abroad. The cross-sectional variation in the valuation premium appears to have little association with such cross-country institutional features as investor protection rules, law enforcement practice, or accounting disclosure standards. Rather the premium appears most related to variation in pre-listing valuation ratios.     

Fast and accurate pricing of barrier options under Lévy processes

We suggest two new fast and accurate methods, the fast Wiener–Hopf (FWH) method and the iterative Wiener–Hopf (IWH) method, for pricing barrier options for a wide class of Lévy processes. Both methods use the Wiener–Hopf factorization and the fast Fourier transform algorithm. We demonstrate the accuracy and fast convergence of both methods using Monte Carlo simulations and an accurate finite difference scheme, compare our results with those obtained by the Cont–Voltchkova method, and explain the differences in prices near the barrier. The first author is supported, in part, by grant RFBR 09-01-00781.     

Explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by US consumers

Motivated by recent policy intervention into payments markets, we develop and estimate a structural model of adoption and use of payment instruments by U.S. consumers. Our structural model differentiates between the adoption and use of payment instruments. We evaluate substitution among payment instruments and welfare implications. Cash is the most significant substitute to debit cards in retail settings, whereas checks are the most significant in bill‐pay settings. Furthermore, low income consumers lose proportionally more than high income consumers when debit cards become more expensive, whereas the reverse is true when credit cards do.     

Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending a message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where agents can send any combination of available messages, we develop an Extended Revelation Principle and characterize the incentive constraints which implementable allocations must satisfy. When not all message combinations are feasible, static mechanisms no longer suffice. If a ‘punishment’ allocation exists for each agent, then implementable allocations can be characterized as equilibria of a “Revelation Game,” in which agents first select from the menus of allocation rules, then the mediator requests each agent to send some verifying messages. When a punishment allocation fails to exist for some agent, dynamic games in which agents gradually reveal their evidence implement a larger set of outcomes. The latter result provides a foundation for a theory of debate.     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

PSEUDODIFFUSIONS AND QUADRATIC TERM STRUCTURE MODELS

The non-Gaussianity of processes observed in financial markets and the relatively good performance of Gaussian models can be reconciled by replacing the Brownian motion with Lévy processes whose Lévy densities decay as  exp(−λ| x |)  or faster, where  λ > 0  is large. This leads to asymptotic pricing models. The leading term, P ₀, is the price in the Gaussian model with the same instantaneous drift and variance. The first correction term depends on the instantaneous moments of order up to 3, that is, the skewness is taken into account, the next term depends on moments of order 4 (kurtosis) as well, etc. In empirical studies, the asymptotic formula can be applied without explicit specification of the underlying process: it suffices to assume that the instantaneous moments of order greater than 2 are small w.r.t. moments of order 1 and 2, and use empirical data on moments of order up to 3 or 4. As an application, the bond-pricing problem in the non-Gaussian quadratic term structure model is solved. For pricing of options near expiry, a different set of asymptotic formulas is developed; they require more detailed specification of the process, especially of its jump part. The leading terms of these formulas depend on the jump part of the process only, so that they can be used in empirical studies to identify the jump characteristics of the process.