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排序方式: 共有253条查询结果,搜索用时 265 毫秒
251.
Mark Kohlbeck Hye Seung Lee Brian Mayhew Jesus M. Salas 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2023,50(9-10):1984-2020
We examine the likelihood and value relevance of related party transactions in family firms. Based on an extensive hand-collected sample, we find that founder-led family firms are more likely to enter into related party transactions than other firms. We also find that the founder-led family firm valuation premium is reduced when these firms disclose related party transactions, especially opportunistic related party transactions. We also examine the significant change in related party transaction reporting regulations enacted in 2006 and find that it led to a decline in the number of value-decreasing related party transactions for founder-led family firms. We find a corresponding decrease in the detrimental effect of related party transactions on founder-led family firms’ valuation. Our results suggest that changes in the 2006 SEC related party transaction reporting regulations better protected minority shareholders from wealth extraction via related party transactions in founder-led family firms. 相似文献
252.
Seunghyun Cho Jinhan Pae Choong-Yuel Yoo 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2023,50(7-8):1128-1165
This study investigates the intragroup flows of brand royalties within large Korean business groups, known as chaebols. We find that member firms pay a greater amount of brand royalties when the business groups they are part of adopt a holding company governance structure, consistent with the bitter denunciation that chaebols transfer wealth from member firms to holding companies over which they have direct control. However, member firms pay a smaller amount of brand royalties when their related-party transactions (RPTs) are monitored by a designated RPT committee on the board of directors. The results show that monitoring RPTs is effective in mitigating the alleged unethical wealth transfer through excessive brand royalties within large business groups. Our study adds to the literature on RPTs by shedding new light on brand royalty, specifically by illustrating how intragroup brand royalties are determined and charged to member firms, and by introducing the RPT committees as a new internal governance mechanism to discourage abusive RPTs. 相似文献
253.
We study how the inaccuracy of a costly certification technology affects a monopolistic seller's profitability. We compare three scenarios: no certification, a 100% accurate certification, and a 50% accurate certification that produces accurate evaluations half the time. The noisy certification environment is never the most profitable and, depending on the buyers' loss aversion, can be the least profitable. However, a noisy certification can be more profitable than an accurate one, as it discourages the over-certification that occurs in an accurate certification environment. Experimentally, the noisy certification is shown to be the least profitable treatment, whereas the accurate certification is shown to be the most profitable. 相似文献