Optimal Returns Policy under Demand Uncertainty

Multiple categories of retail products suffer limited shelf life, demand uncertainty, and, in some cases, long lead times. To provide retailers with an incentive to increase the stocking quantity of such products, manufacturers may offer an option to return unsold items at wholesale or less than wholesale prices. This article extends the additive price-dependent demand model in three ways. First, partial returns are optimal for the manufacturer but do not induce higher stocking quantities compared with when the manufacturer offers no returns. Second, in terms of the effect of investment in demand-enhancing activities, when retailers invest, they set higher resale prices, but an optimal partial returns policy still does not induce higher stocking quantity, whereas when manufacturers invest, the optimal returns policy induces higher stocking quantity. Third, when the manufacturer and retailer have different expectations of demand uncertainty, the retailer's estimate influences the expected profits for both, whereas the manufacturer's estimate has a major impact on its profits only.     

When an executive defects

The news that one of the company's senior managers is leaving comes as a complete surprise to Paul Simmonds, CEO of Kinsington Textiles, Inc. Ned Carpenter, KTI's vice president of operations for three years, writes in his resignation letter than he is leaving for a better opportunity. Simmonds soon learns that Carpenter's new job is at Daltex, one of KTI's main rivals in the intensely competitive carpet industry. Hiring Carpenter had helped Simmonds establish his reputation as a topnotch manager. Carpenter came to KTI with lots of ideas and put his enthusiasm to good use. Three years into a five-year change program, Carpenter had turned KTI's operations from one of the worst in the industry to one of the best. He also had helped develop and plan the upcoming launch of a new fiber coating--KTI's first breakthrough in years. In this fictitious case study, Simmonds, along with the company's counsel and vice president of human resources, must figure out how much and what sort of damage control they need. What are they going to tell the company's employees and the media? Should they immediately replace Carpenter with John Brady, the second-in-command of operations? What if Carpenter is taking KTI employees--and strategic information--with him to Daltex? Should Simmonds ask all his managers to sign noncompete agreements-something Carpenter was never asked to do? Should KTI sue Carpenter? Five experts offer advice about communicating with KTI's employees, the media, and Carpenter himself, and about protecting the company's confidential information.     

Extent of corporate governance disclosure by banks and finance companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange

Corporate governance disclosure has seen renewed interest by researchers, policy makers, and regulating bodies internationally, but has remained only an emerging construct in Nepal. The primary purpose of this study was to assess the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure in Nepal. The secondary purpose was to examine the associations between the extent of disclosures and five firm-specific characteristics. The third purpose was to assess the significant determinants to explain variations of disclosures. The study's sampling frame consisted of 125 banking and finance companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange. A sample size of 59 companies was randomly selected. On average, companies disclosed 91% of items in the mandatory category, 48% in the voluntary category, and 74% in total. A significant positive correlation existed between governance disclosures and firm characteristics of size, leverage, and foreign ownership. There was no significant relation between governance disclosure and listing age or profitability. With regards to determinants, bank size was a significant predictor of governance disclosure. Three regression models for total disclosures (DScore), mandatory disclosures [DScore (M)], and voluntary disclosures [DScore (V)] with three predictors of size, leverage, and foreign ownership were significant and explained 47%, 24%, and 54% variations respectively in total, mandatory, and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in Nepal. This research provides guidelines to policy makers and standard setters for developing future regulations and accounting policies.     

Healthcare utilization and costs among relapsed or refractory multiple myeloma patients on carfilzomib or pomalidomide as monotherapy or in combination with dexamethasone

Aim: To compare monthly healthcare resource utilization (HRU) and costs among adult patients with multiple myeloma (MM) receiving second or subsequent line of treatment (LOT) with carfilzomib or pomalidomide as monotherapy or in combination with dexamethasone.

Methods and materials: Adult MM patients who received carfilzomib or pomalidomide as second/subsequent LOT between 2006 and 2014 were selected from the MarketScan databases. LOT was determined using Medical/pharmacy claims using a published algorithm. For each patient, first LOT with carfilzomib or pomalidomide was defined as index LOT. Patients with first LOT as index LOT, who received other chemotherapy in combination with carfilzomib or pomalidomide, or who underwent stem cell transplant (STC) during index LOT were excluded. Monthly HRU and costs during index LOT were compared using inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) based on propensity scores for receipt of carfilzomib estimated by logistic regression with LOT, patient demographics, Charlson index, comorbidities, pre-index healthcare cost, and receipt of prior SCT as covariates.

Results: After weighting, baseline characteristics were well balanced among 114 carfilzomib and 144 pomalidomide patients. Mean (95% CI) numbers of outpatient visits per month were 7.1 (5.2–8.0) with carfilzomib and 4.7 (3.9–6.1) with pomalidomide (p?=?0.006). Otherwise, there were no statistically significant differences between the groups in mean monthly HRU and costs or median time to therapy discontinuation. Mean (95% CI) monthly total healthcare costs were $19,776 (15,322–27,748) with pomalidomide and $17,321 (12,412–21,874) with carfilzomib (p?=?0.522).

Limitations: Comparison of carfilzomib vs pomalidomide may be biased if there are unobserved factors not balanced by IPTW. The relatively small sample size limits the power of analyses to detect potential differences between treatment groups.

Conclusions: Monthly HRU and costs are similar among patients with relapse or refractory MM patients receiving carfilzomib or pomalidomide as monotherapy or in combination with dexamethasone.     

An investigation of the effects of exchange rate volatility on exports in East Asia

This study investigates the effects of the exchange rate volatility on the export flows of Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines during 1974–2011. Towards this goal a trade weighted real effective (rather than the bilateral) exchange rate and three different measures of volatility, i.e. obtained from an ARCH model, a GARCH model and a moving-average standard deviation measure are used in this study. Specifically, the export flows between six Asian countries and the rest of the world are investigated rather than focusing on trade with only one country. Our findings reveal that the exchange rate volatility has a significant impact on export flows in the short run as well as in the long run for all the countries in the sample. The impact in the long run is predominantly negative with the exception of Singapore, but in the short run the impact varies across countries. Moreover, our results are robust to the alternative measures of volatility used and most of the findings in the long run and short run are also robust to the crisis period.     

ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING

We introduce a framework to theoretically and empirically examine electoral maldistricting—the intentional drawing of electoral districts to advance partisan objectives, compromising voter welfare. We identify the legislatures that maximize voter welfare and those that maximize partisan goals, and incorporate them into a maldistricting index. This index measures the intent to maldistrict by comparing distances from the actual legislature to the nearest partisan and welfare-maximizing legislatures. Using 2008 presidential election data and 2010 census-based district maps, we find a Republican-leaning bias in district maps. Our index tracks court rulings in intuitive ways.