Investment Patterns of Informal Investors in the Alberta Private Equity Market*

This study identifies three main types of informal investors in private equity markets: relationship investors, opportunity‐based investors, and angel investors. We find evidence that the first two investor types are a major total source of capital and they prefer to invest smaller amounts close to home and in the context of existing relationships. With respect to angel investors, we find evidence of stratification in their desired investment amount which is consistent with a model where their investments evolve though a life cycle of investing. We also find evidence that changes to capital market regulations that allow for lower investment amounts by this type of investor increase the amount of capital available for early‐stage firms.     

Interlinking and Collusion

In this paper, we suggest a new rationale for the existence of interlinked contracts in the agrarian economies of developing countries. Using the framework of an infinitely repeated game with discounting, we show that interlinked contracts can help the dominant parties to collude, in cases where collusion is not possible with noninterlinked contracts. This occurs because either interlinkage pools incentive constraints across markets, or it affects the incentives of agents to accept deviating contracts. We illustrate these mechanisms by considering the case of interlinkage between markets for credit and share tenancy. The model that is used to formalize the second mechanism is characterized by frictions in the tenancy market, which we model using the standard framework of search and matching.     

Correlation testing in time series,spatial and cross-sectional data

We provide a general class of tests for correlation in time series, spatial, spatio-temporal and cross-sectional data. We motivate our focus by reviewing how computational and theoretical difficulties of point estimation mount, as one moves from regularly-spaced time series data, through forms of irregular spacing, and to spatial data of various kinds. A broad class of computationally simple tests is justified. These specialize to Lagrange multiplier tests against parametric departures of various kinds. Their forms are illustrated in case of several models for describing correlation in various kinds of data. The initial focus assumes homoscedasticity, but we also robustify the tests to nonparametric heteroscedasticity.     

Size,ownership and the market for corporate control

This paper is written with two goals in mind. The first is to offer a critical discussion of papers by Bauguess, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Zutter [Bauguess, Scott, Moeller, Sara, Schlingemann, Frederich and Zutter, Chad, 2009. Ownership structure and target returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], and Offenberg [Offenberg, David, 2009. Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], both of which appear in this special issue. The second goal is to offer some perspectives about new questions that these papers bring to light.     

Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis

We revisit and critically reevaluate the widely accepted modernization hypothesis which claims that per capita income causes the creation and the consolidation of democracy. Existing studies find support for this hypothesis because they fail to control for the presence of omitted variables. Controlling for these factors either by including country fixed effects in a linear model or by including parameterized random effects in a nonlinear double hazard model removes the correlation between income and the likelihood of transitions to and from democratic regimes. In addition, the estimated fixed effects from the linear model are related to historical factors that affect both the level of income per capita and the likelihood of democracy in a country. This evidence is consistent with the idea that events during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political-economic development paths, some leading to prosperity and democracy, others to relative poverty and non-democracy.     

The Nature of Responsibility in a Professional Setting

This paper begins by looking at the complex and dynamic nature of responsibility. Based in the interconnected concepts of imputability, accountability and liability it argues that, whilst some elements of responsibility can be determined through role and contract, the broader sense of liability involves a sense of shared responsibility that is ultimately based in the concept of universal responsibility. Such responsibility requires core virtues, not least awareness and integrity, a continued means of negotiating responsibility and ongoing dialogue between the different responsibilities connected to role. The paper argues that the nature of such dialogue is itself grounded in the development of personal and shared responsibility. It concludes that the professions have a moral leadership role in articulating and modelling that responsibility. This article is a Keynote speech by the author, Prof. Dr. Simon Robinson.     

Human resource management responsibilities in private clubs

ABSTRACT

Private clubs have long been considered a unique segment of the hospitality industry. Clubs are different than other types of hospitality enterprises in many respects, including their ownership, revenue sources, management, and specifically, in the management of human resources. This article focuses on how human resources are managed in one regional chapter of the national association of club managers (New England). First, a focus group of club managers in New England was conducted. Next, a survey was conducted of club managers belonging to the New England chapter of the Club Managers Association of America. Findings suggest that very few clubs have human resource directors; responsibilities tend to be delegated through the organization; clubs have certain human resource management challenges associated with not having a human resource director; and general managers are actively involved in the management of human resources.