Predation and accumulation

This article incorporates the economic theory of predation into the theory of economic growth. The analytical framework is a general-equilibrium model of the interaction between two dynasties: a potential predator and its prey. We find that the rate of accumulation of capital and the security of property are positively related only for generations of the prey dynasty that tolerate predation. Generations of the prey dynasty that choose to deter predation, even though their property is perfectly secure, accumulate productive capital more slowly than the preceding generations that tolerated predation.     

China's foreign trade policy and world trade organization membership

This paper provides an overview of China's major economic reforms and how they impacted certain key domestic economic indicators such as income, production, employment, and prices. More importantly, the paper concentrates on China's foreign trade focusing on such issues as import and export policies, exchange rate controls, foreign investments, balance of payments, traded commodities, and major trading partners. China's chance of becoming a member of the World Trade Organization is also addressed.     

Congestion pricing of Canadian airports

Abstract Under congestion pricing, Canadian airports would annually save between $72 and $105 million. Social costs per landing and takeoff decrease about $300 at Toronto and Vancouver and $50 at Calgary and Montreal. Slot constraints fail to eliminate this airport congestion. Congestion prices are lower on average than existing weight‐based prices. Current airport capacity accommodates at least five more years of traffic growth before congestion reaches current levels. Substantial welfare gains occur even if dominant airlines already internalize their self‐imposed delays. This article calculates equilibrium congestion pricing schedules, traffic rates, queuing delays, layover times, and connection times by time of day.     

Economic and Monetary Union – Current Fiscal Disturbances and the Future

At the moment of its setting up the Economic and Monetary Union did not meet the criteria of the optimum currency area. Neither does it today. The crisis of public finance in the eurozone results from the abandonment public finance reforms, lack of consistency in enforcing the decision of the Stability and Growth Pact and, additionally, economic recession and financial crisis. Further functioning of the eurozone will depend on radical reforms of public finance and structural reforms enhancing efficiency of the market as an adjustment mechanism, and competitiveness of economies. The very establishment of the European Stabilization Mechanism and European Financial Stability cannot make up for the above mentioned necessary undertakings. It is important to change the socioeconomic model existing in the EU member countries.     

The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information

We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically. Specifically, a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders’ reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy. In our model, some traders may have non-vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy. Although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved, we show that, given any desired level of approximation, there is such that any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with or more traders leads, with high probability, to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy. In particular, allocations are approximately efficient. A key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non-strategically.     

When do incentives work in channels of distribution?

The incentive dilemma refers to a situation in which incentives are offered but do not work as intended. The authors suggest that, in an interorganizational context, whether a principal-provided incentive works is a function of how it is evaluated by an agent: for its contribution to the agent’s bottom line (instrumental evaluation) and for the extent it is strategically aligned with the agent’s direction (congruence evaluation). To further understand when incentives work, the influence of two key contextual variables—industry volatility and dependence—are examined. A field study featuring 57 semi-structured depth interviews and 386 responses from twin surveys in the information technology and brewing industries provide data for hypothesis testing. When and whether incentives work is demonstrated by certain conditions under which the agent’s evaluation of an incentive has positive or negative effects on its compliance and active representation. Further, some outcomes are reversed in the high volatility condition.     

How Productive Is Workplace Health and Safety?

In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of workplace health and safety practices on firm performance, using Danish longitudinal matched employer–employee data merged with unique cross‐sectional representative firm survey data on work environment conditions. We estimate standard production functions, augmented with workplace environment indicators, addressing both time‐invariant and time‐varying potentially relevant unobservables in the production process. We find positive and large productivity effects of improved physical dimensions of the health and safety environment, specifically, “internal climate” and “monotonous repetitive work”.     

The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule. Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002 Correspondence to:S. Nitzan     

Scarcity and appropriative competition

This paper formalizes the commonsensical hypothesis that resource scarcity causes a large allocation of time and effort to appropriative competition. Our main innovation is to model explicitly the positive intertemporal effect of consumption on the probability of survival. The critical assumption is that this effect becomes stronger as resources become scarcer. We also show that anticipated future resource abundance increases the incremental value of survival and, consequently, amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative competition. Interestingly, if resources are currently scarce, then larger anticipated future abundance can cause a big enough increase in the time and effort allocated to appropriative competition to result in a decrease in the sum of current and expected future utility, a “paradox of anticipated abundance”.     

Strategic restraint in contests

Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.