Prize sharing in collective contests

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private–public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. It is shown that endogenous determination of group sharing rules completely eliminates the group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always attains a higher winning probability than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. In addition, an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing rules is revealed: The group attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members.     

Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case

In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on ${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$ and ${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.     

Median-based extensions of an ordering over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization

In this paper we consider the problem of inducing an ordering over the set of all non-empty subsets of a finite set X of alternatives, given an ordering R over X. Assuming R to be antisymmetric and X to have at least six elements, we provide a set of independent, necessary, and sufficient conditions for the induced ordering to be “median-based” (so that every non-empty subset of X is “indifferent” to its own median set defined in terms of R).     

Fostering Systematic Innovative Thinking and Problem Solving: Lessons Education Can Learn From Industry

This article aims to illuminate different means of nurturing creativity in the high-tech industry and in modern organizations, particularly in the context of problem solving and product development, and to examine the potential implications for technology education. There is a large gap between conventional wisdom, which maintains that technology education is intended to foster creative thinking among pupils, and reality in the field. The case study presented is that of a mid-sized Israeli industrial plant, dealing with the design and production of construction tools for professionals and domestic use, such as spirit levels, measuring tapes, squares and rulers. This plant utilized innovation, uniqueness and quality as the main instruments in the battle for the market. A series of workshops for the plant's staff, entitled ‘Systematic Inventive Thinking’, resulted in the development of a range of new, original and successful products. The cumulative experience indicated that people can learn efficient techniques for solving a problem, or developing a new product, by breaking it down to its basic components, by ‘playing' systematically with ideas, in order to achieve new results. The notion that methodical courses can trigger pupils' incentive to be innovative and original, and can foster teamwork is almost absent from the field of education. Educators and scholars in technology education pay little regard to teaching and exploiting methods to fostering systematic original thinking and problem-solving. The challenge in education is to find an optimal combination and balance between fostering activity based on openness and ‘disorder’, on the one hand, and imparting systematic methods for innovative thinking and problem-solving, on the other. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.     

Approval voting reconsidered

Summary. The merit of approval voting has been widely discussed in the past 25 years. The distinct property of this rule is the extent of flexibility it allows; any voter can approve as many alternatives/candidates as he wishes. Nevertheless, this advantage is the very reason for two drawbacks of approval voting: its extreme vulnerability to majority decisiveness (Theorem 1) and its extreme vulnerability to erosion of the majority principle (Theorem 2). On the one hand, under some feasible voting strategies any majority of more than 1/2 of the voters can guarantee the selection of its most favorable candidate, regardless of the preferences of the other voters. On the other hand, under alternative voting strategies even the largest majority cannot impose its common most preferred candidate. A simultaneous resolution of the two problems is possible by restricted approval voting (RAV), a voting rule that allows partial voter flexibility by restricting the minimal and maximal number of candidates that can be approved. Our main result (Theorem 3) clarifies how the foregone flexibility in voters sovereignty mitigates the above mentioned drawbacks under sincere and insincere coordinated voting. Our findings suggest a new possible justification of a particular voting rule which is based on the significance assigned to three considerations: the advantages of voters flexibility, immunity to majority decisiveness and immunity to erosion of the majority principle. Such justification can provide a possible explanation to the prevalent use of some special cases of RAV, notably, of the plurality rule and of approval voting.Received: 8 October 2003, Revised: 17 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D72. Correspondence to: Shmuel NitzanWe are indebted to Steve Brams, Remzi Sanver and an anonymous referee for their very useful comments and suggestions.     

Rational Buyer Meets Rational Seller: Reserves Market Equilibria under Alternative Auction Designs

We examine efficiency properties and incentive compatibility of alternative auction formats that an electricity network system operator may use for the procurement of ancillary services required for real-time operations. We model the procurement auction as a hierarchical multiproduct auction, and study several designs such as a uniform price auction minimizing revealed social cost, a uniform price auction minimizing the system operator's cost and a pay as bid auction minimizing revealed social cost. We take into account that rational bidders will respond to any market design so as to maximize their expected benefit from participating in that market. Under the assumptions of our model, we show that the uniform price auction minimizing revealed social cost is the only one that guarantees productive efficiency. We also find that expected revenue (payment in our case) equivalence between pay as bid and uniform price auctions does not extend to the hierarchical products case and the ranking of these auctions is ambiguous and depends on the data. For the procurement auction minimizing the system operator's cost, we show that misrepresentation of capability may result in capacity shortages if there are capacity constraints. For the case where only higher capability resources are constrained, this will result in random price spikes decreasing in frequency with the price cap (this is the amount paid to capacity in demand states with shortages). When lower type resources are capacity constrained as well, price spikes will be seen for both type of resources. Such artificial shortages result in reduced reliability in real-time operations.     

Proactive planning and valuation of transmission investments in restructured electricity markets

Traditional methods of evaluating transmission expansions focus on the social impact of the investments based on the current generation stock which may include firm generation expansion plans. In this paper, we evaluate the social welfare implications of transmission investments based on equilibrium models characterizing the competitive interaction among generation firms whose decisions in generation capacity investments and production are affected by both the transmission investments and the congestion management protocols of the transmission system operator. Our analysis shows that both the magnitude of the welfare gains associated with transmission investments and the location of the best transmission expansions may change when the generation expansion response is taken into consideration. We illustrate our results using a 30-bus network example. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Trading frequency and the efficiency of price discovery in a non-dealer market

The increasing popularity of non-dealer security markets that offer automated, computer-based, continuous trading reflects a presumption that institutionally-set trading sessions are economically obsolete. This theoretical paper investigates the effect of the trading frequency, a key feature of the trading mechanism, on the efficiency of price discovery in a non-dealer market. By tracing the market pricing error to the correlation structures of arriving information and pricing errors of individual traders, the effect of diverging expectations on error-based and overall return volatility is isolated. The analysis reveals that, due to a portfolio effect, an increase in the trading time interval has contradictory effects on the portion of return volatility stemming from pricing errors. The greater accumulation of information increases error-based return volatility, but the greater volume and number of traders per session have the opposite effect. The net effect on overall return volatility can go either way. It is found that the return volatility of heavily traded securities is likely to be minimized under continuous trading, but that of thinly traded securities may be minimized under discrete trading at moderate time intervals. The latter is more likely to occur the greater is the divergence of expectations among traders. These findings challenge the presumption that automated continuous trading in a non-dealer market is more efficient than discrete trading for all securities, regardless of trading volume. The findings are applicable to all economies, but have special importance for developing countries where typically a single market is dominated by small issues and a low volume of trade. As a by-product of the analysis, it is shown how to correct the biased estimate of inter-session price volatility when observations are less frequent than the trading sessions themselves.