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11.
Shmuel Leshem 《The Rand journal of economics》2010,41(2):398-416
This article shows that innocent suspects benefit from exercising their right to silence during criminal proceedings. We present a model in which a criminal suspect can either make a statement or remain silent during police interrogation. At trial, the jury observes informative but imperfect signals about the suspect's guilt and the truthfulness of the suspect's statement. We show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects by providing them with a safer alternative to speech, as well as by reducing the probability of wrongful conviction for suspects who remain silent with and without a right to silence. 相似文献
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This paper uses a model similar to the Boyle-Vorst and Ritchken-Kuo arbitrage-free models for the valuation of options with transactions costs to determine the maximum price to be charged by the financial intermediary writing an option in a non-auction market. Earlier models are extended by recognizing that, in the presence of transactions costs, the price-taking intermediary devising a hedging portfolio faces a tradeoff: to choose a short trading interval with small hedging errors and high transactions costs, or a long trading interval with large hedging errors and low transactions costs. The model presented here also recognizes that when transactions costs induce less frequent portfolio adjustments, investors are faced with a multinomial distribution of asset returns rather than a binomial one. The price upper bound is determined by selecting the trading frequency that will equalize the marginal gain from decreasing hedging errors and the marginal cost of transactions. 相似文献
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Shmuel Sharir 《Southern economic journal》1999,65(4):953-958
A recent thoughtful paper by Singell and Thornton (thereafter ST) in the Southern Economic Journal deviates in definitions, modeling, and a result from the traditional literature on tastes for discrimination and nepotism that originates with Becker and Arrow. This comment provides a critique of these three aspects of the ST analysis. In particular, it shows that ST's astonishing result that discrimination will persist in a competitive labor market is unjustified, ST's unconventional definitions of owners with unbiased and biased preferences are wrong, and ST's unique modeling of discrimination and nepotism is unsupported. 相似文献
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The current note clarifies that Condorcet Jury Theorem cannot be generalized to the extended setting where individual decisional
skills are not assumed to be exogenous parameters even when these skills are homogeneous. This is true when skills are determined
endogenously either by a central planner or, in a decentralized strategic setting, by the decision makers themselves. 相似文献
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We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto-preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a degree of altruism is in general Pareto-preferred, because it reduces socially wasteful activities, such as lobbying, bargaining and other rent seeking activities designed to increase one agent's expected share of the contested rent. We present a stylized model that captures the role of education in generating altruism and thus reducing the expenditure on rent seeking. 相似文献
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Environment is shifting the power balance between the organization and its members, providing the individual with the power to bargain with the organization. The present article explores the sources and consequences of this change for the individuals who are members of strategic alliances as well as for the organizations they are affiliated with. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 相似文献