Controlling inflation in Euroland

The experience with the two pillar strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB) suggests that at some point in the future the ECB may have to commit to one of the more traditional policy strategies – a direct inflation target or an intermediate monetary target. This study offers some information on the scale of control and indicator problems associated with both strategies. We estimate the links between monetary policy actions and inflation in dynamic linear models with the Kalman filter. Using European M3 that the ECB has published, it is found that the overall control problems involved in targeting money are larger than for direct inflation targets.     

Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis

This paper investigates agents who face a stylized pecuniary ‘game of life’ comprising the ultimatum game and the dictator game. Utility may but need not be attached to equity and reciprocity, as formalized by Falk and Fischbacher (Games Econom Behav, 54(2): 293–315, 2006) but, critically, this social component of preferences cannot be conditioned on whether an ultimatum or a dictator game is played. Evolutionary fitness of agents is determined solely by material success. Under these conditions, a strong preference for reciprocity, but little interest in equity as such evolves. Possible exogenous constraints that link reciprocity and equity concerns imply long-run levels of both which depend on the relative frequency of ultimatum vs. dictator interaction in agents’ multi-game environment. Financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence

We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true even though the players are given exactly the same instructions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Schmerz lass nach

Schmerzberatung optimieren - Statt sie ernst zu nehmen und behandeln zu lassen, stecken ?ltere Patienten Schmerzen lieber weg. Das mag an ihrer Sozialisation liegen. Doch in der pflegerischen Betreuung sollten Schmerzen enttabuisiert werden. Auch die versorgenden Angeh?rigen sollten dies beherzigen.     

Zur Wirkung regulatorischer Preiseingriffe auf dem Tankstellenmarkt

Das Bundeskartellamt hat die M?rkte für Benzin und Diesel in Deutschland untersucht und ein oligopolistisches Umfeld diagnostiziert, das zu erh?hten Preisen führt. Der Nutzen eines regulatorischen Eingriffs nach dem Vorbild des „?sterreichischen Modells“ wird jedoch sowohl vom Amt als auch von der Fach?ffentlichkeit in Frage gestellt. Diese preisregulatorische Ma?nahme wird hier spieltheoretisch und experimentell analysiert.