Multistage bilateral bargaining model with incomplete information—A fuzzy approach

The study proposes the implementation of an intermediation model in supply chains, integrating game theory and fuzzy logic, to represent the characteristic aspects of a bilateral bargaining with incomplete information where supplier–customer relationships are indirectly managed by a third party agent.The choice of combining these theories comes out from the necessity of smoothing the peculiar elements of the two analysis tools that, in describing real situations, present many potentialities of reciprocal adaptation. The scope is to combine a formal structure that could figure out the interrelations among actors involved in a strategic decisional context, with a mathematical elaboration of natural imprecision, uncertainty and incompleteness of data and information.The model derives from the theoretic foundation of Spulber [1999. Market Microstructure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK] and Rubinstein [1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–109] that, compared to the classical framework of asymmetric information and bid-spread problem by Harsanyi [1967. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. I. The basic model. Management Science 14, 159–182], describe the process through the definition of new parameters such as bargaining power and breakdown probability. The contribution to the research is enriched by fuzzyfication process of data, considering Qi et al. [2005. Design retrieval technology of fuzzy customer requirements. In: World Congress on Mass Customization and Personalization] experiences, to build a framework that could transform inputs from the transaction, agents and market in an output that could regulate the possible concessions and the opportunity of accepting or refusing an offer.     

对重大环境污染事故罪的探讨

20世纪70年代以来，我国环保工作由于政府的重视而逐渐进入了法制的轨道，大量关于环境保护的法律法规相继出台；但目前仍存在大量的环境污染和环境破坏问题，这给社会经济发展和人民生命财产造成了严重危害。为了适应惩治环境犯罪的需要．重大环境污染事故罪作为新增罪名被写入97刑法中。目前法学界对该罪仍存争议，从犯罪构成要件入手对本罪主、客观要件作一些探讨具有现实意义。     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

IS CORPORATISM FEASIBLE?

This paper investigates the effects of cooperation (corporatism) on macroeconomic performance by considering a rather standard policy game between the government and a monopoly union. We stress the shortcomings of the traditional way used to model cooperation in policy games (the maximization of the weighted sum of players’ preferences), which only approximates the Nash product solution. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, as it often reduces the union's utility. In particular, we show that an inflation‐neutral union will never find it profitable to cooperate with the government, unless side‐payments are considered. The study of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.     

Business Ethics: Law As A Determinant of Business Conduct

The Principles of Corporate Governance require that business conduct conform to the law. In recent years, news reports of business misconduct have cast doubt on a conclusion that conformity is the prevalent practice. This article explores the influence of law on business conduct by comparing the law’s requirements and purposes with actual business conduct in the market. Specifically, it explores whether certain legal regimes are more effective than others in inducing greater commitment to legal compliance by corporate actors. The conclusion drawn is that the prevalent legal regime – a vague common law or legislative mandate – is typically associated with corporate conduct that evades or ignores the law’s mandate or its underlying purpose. Vincent Di Lorenzo is Professor of Law; Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center for Church and Society, St. John's University; J.D. Columbia University (Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar); Associate Articles Editor, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems. Before joining the faculty at St. John's University School of Law, Professor Di Lorenzo was a member of the faculty at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and was associated with a major Wall Street firm practicing in the real estate-banking department. He is a member of the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association. Professor Di Lorenzo has authored many articles and books in the banking, legislation and real estate areas.     

城市视觉导向系统的设计与传播机能

认为城市视觉情报及导向系统在城市建设和规划中占据着显要位置,精确良好的视觉导向系统,不但方便了人们的出行,也对城市美化起着点睛作用。通过对比国内外城市视觉导向系统的现状,对导向系统的设计、规划要点及其传播机能进行分析,强调标识系统的重要性和普及的意义。     

箱体设备隔热降温措施研究

文章设计了一种可自然降低箱内温度的新型户外箱体结构,该箱体结构由内壁导热层、外壁隔热层以及由内壁和外壁形成的中间散热层组成。这种箱体结构可有效阻挡外界阳光和热空气的热量导入箱内,同时可将箱体内产生的热量通过内壁导热层由中间散热层及时排出箱体外。与普通金属箱体相比,箱内温度可降低10℃左右,因此,特别适合于在电力系统内的户外箱体上使用。