Product choice with economies of scope

This paper develops a model in which two competing firms on a bounded line each sell two products. Production costs for each firm are lower the closer are its two products. It is shown that there may be anywhere from zero to three possible equilibrium configurations. Equilibrium may entail market segmentation, market interlacing or an intermediate case. The paper contributes to two bodies of literature: (i) Industrial organization. When the line is interpreted as a one-dimensional characteristic space, the model provides an appealing explanation of economies of scope in multi-product firms. (ii) Firm location theory. The model relaxes the unrealistic assumption made in spatial models that each firm has a single outlet and obtains significantly different results.     

Private and public sector regulation of competitively tendered contracts

This paper addresses two contractual issues using a sample of competitively tendered contracts for cleaning services. First, the paper considers the characteristics that distinguish private from public sector organisations in their methods of selection and regulation of contractors. Secondly, the paper examines the perceived effectiveness of such regulatory mechanisms in terms of compliance with contract specifications and overall assessment of quality. Econometric analysis reveals that private sector organisations differ from their public sector counterparts in the selection procedures of contractors. Moreover, significant differences emerge in the apparent efficacy of a range of regulatory instruments in assuring contractual performance.We are grateful to Jörg Finsinger and participants at the Industrial Organization Conference in Vienna (1992) for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

‘Fog in the Channel,continent isolated’: Britain as a model for EU social and economic policy?

A discourse on British ‘exceptionalism’ is currently developing according to which the UK's apparently ‘flexible’ economy should serve as a model for the rest of the EU. This is explored through two case studies concerning the transmission of regulatory practices from the continent to Britain (working time) and vice versa (takeover regulation). We suggest that a UK model of the firm constructed around shareholder value and untrammeled managerial prerogative is unlikely to have much resonance for other European systems, in which the term ‘flexibility’ has different connotations.     

Workplace Risk, Establishment Size and Union Density

The health and safety risk faced by individual employees can be treated as an unobservable latent variable which manifests itself at workplace level through reported counts of work‐related injuries and illnesses over a given interval. This paper presents results from count data regressions using data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. The findings strongly support the view that employees in larger establishments have a lower probability of being injured or falling ill. In addition, establishments with a higher proportion of unionized employees, and with health and safety committees, were associated with higher numbers of reported injuries and illnesses.     

Let's use the controller in contract negotiations

The controller is in the best position to evaluate the costs of proposals and counter-proposals in bargaining sessions; he should be a regular member of the negotiating team.