“(MA)LINGERING ON THE DISABLED LIST”

In this article, we examine two offsetting incentives that may affect a baseball player's willingness to play with injuries. We allow for the usual disincentive effects associated with long‐term contracts, while also incorporating the importance of the incentives associated with contract renewal. Our results are consistent with the previous work that showed those likely to retire at the end of their current contracts have an increased incentive to shirk. For those who expect to re‐sign a subsequent contract, however, we find that players tend to step up their effort as they approach the final year of their contract. (JEL L83)     

Value of public goods from sports stadiums: the CVM approach

Many state and local governments have subsidized the construction of arenas and stadium for the use of professional sports teams. They often justify the subsidies by claiming the projects generate valuable public goods and positive externalities, though such benefits are difficult to measure. This article reports an application of the contingent valuation method (CVM) to measure the value of public goods generated by two proposed projects in Lexington, Kentucky: a new basketball arena for the University of Kentucky and a minor league baseball stadium. Neither project would generate sufficiently valuable public goods to justify public financing. Although the results cannot be generalized to other cases, they do shed light on some of the main issues involved, and they demonstrate the feasibility of applying CVM to the evaluation of the subsidized stadiums.     

A general equilibrium approach to aggregate capital–energy complementarity

Capital–energy complementarity is examined through the comparative statics of a simple aggregate model. An exact formula is given for the direction of interaction in terms of derivatives of the production function and factor supply elasticities.     

Rethinking Fiscal Policy

The use of fiscal policy as a stabilization device has all butvanished, more or less explicitly in Europe and de facto inthe United States. The practical consequences have not beenentirely satisfactory, in either place. So it is important andtimely that the Oxford Review is devoting a special issue tothe macroeconomics of fiscal policy. In this paper I want todiscuss two underlying questions about the eclipse of fiscalpolicy. Why did this happen and was it a good idea? And if itwas not a good idea, then what follows? Footnotes ¹ E-mail address: jamu{at}mit.edu