"Export Experience" under Borrowing Constraints

The paper develops a two‐period, two‐country, multigood model with endogenous investment. Borrowing is subject to quantitative restrictions. The authors examine the effect of promoting exports in period 1 on the level of exports in period 2. They consider a number of scenarios depending on how the initial values of the policy instruments are determined, and compare the “export‐experience” effects under the different scenarios.     

Trade and domestic tax reforms in the presence of a public good and different neutrality conditions

This paper develops a perfectly competitive general-equilibrium model of a small open economy with production of private traded goods and of a public good which is financed by revenues from trade and domestic taxes. Within this framework we consider the effects on public good provision and on welfare of the following tax reforms: (i) a producer-price-neutral reduction in export taxes and a corresponding increase in production taxes, (ii) a consumer-price-neutral reduction in tariffs and a corresponding increase in consumption taxes, and (iii) a partial tax-revenue-neutral reform in trade and domestic taxes.     

Cost heterogeneity and the destination of Japanese foreign direct investment: A theoretical and empirical analysis

This paper first of all develops a Cournot oligopolistic model with heterogeneous firms to examine each firm's choice between export-oriented foreign direct investments (FDI) and FDI to serve the host-country market. It is shown that there exist a critical level of efficiency such that all firms below that level choose the former and those above it the latter. The hypothesis is tested using firm-level data on 118,300 Japanese firms covering the entire manufacturing sector. Multinomial logit estimates strongly support our theoretical findings.     

Export–Oriented Foreign Direct Investment and Local Content Requirement

We develop a model in which foreign firms locate in a host country and export their produce to another (consuming) country. We consider both exogenous and endogenous numbers of foreign firms. These firms compete with domestic firms in the consuming country under oligopoly. Unemployment exists in both countries. We analyse the conflict of interest between the two countries on the level of local content for the foreign firms. Under free entry of foreign firms, the consuming country may want a less severe restriction on local contents than the host country, but not so when the number of foreign firms is exogenous.     

Can cross–border pollution reduce pollution?

We develop a two–country model of foreign aid and cross–border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient country. There is both private and public abatement of pollution, the latter being financed through emissions tax revenue and foreign aid. We characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the donor country chooses the amount of aid and the recipient chooses the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement and the emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, an increase in the donor’s perceived rate of cross–border pollution reduces emission levels. JEL Classification: Q28, F35, H41 Est–ce que la pollution trans–frontière peut réduire le niveau de pollution? Les auteurs développent un modèle à deux pays d’aide à l’étranger et de pollution trans–frontière résultant d’activités de production dans le pays qui reçoit l’aide. Il existe des efforts privés et publics pour réduire la pollution, ces derniers étant financés par les rentrées fiscales d’une taxe sur la pollution et par l’aide étrangère. On définit un équilibre à la Nash pour lequel le pays donateur choisit le montant de l’aide, et le pays récipiendaire choisit la fraction de l’aide étrangère qu’il allouera à la lutte à la pollution ainsi que le taux de taxation sur la pollution. A cet équilibre, un accroissement dans le taux de pollution trans–frontière perçu par le donataire réduit le taux de pollution.