Geographic concentration and vertical disintegration: Evidence from China

Existing theoretical literature predicts that geographic concentration encourages vertical disintegration of firms. Nevertheless, empirical evidence of this prediction is limited, especially in developing countries. Using data on manufacturing firms from China, this paper documents a positive correlation between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration. Additionally, this paper uses the instrumental variable approach to address the issue of endogeneity and finds that geographic concentration has a positive causal effect on vertical disintegration.     

“Panelizing” Repeated Cross Sections

This paper considers the implementation of a non-stationary, heterogeneous Markov model for the analysis of binary dependent variables in a time series of repeated cross-sectional (RCS) surveys. The model offers the opportunity to estimate entry and exit transition probabilities and to examine the effects of time-constant and time-varying covariates on the hazards. We show how maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters can be obtained by Fishers method-of-scoring and how to estimate both fixed and time-varying covariate effects. The model is exemplified with an analysis of the labor force participation decision of Dutch and West German women using ISSP (and other) data from 10 annual Dutch surveys conducted between 1987 and 1996 and 7 annual West German surveys conducted between 1988 and 1994. Some open problems concerning the application of the model are discussed.     

Destructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good game

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%.     

Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks

This paper examines the relation between incentive pay, monitoring, and regulatory requirements in banks. Using a one-period model with asymmetrical information between the bank owner and the top management team, as well as within the team itself, we show that (1) incentive pay increases the mutual-monitoring activity among top executives; (2) senior executives, especially the CEO, collect more incentive pay than their subordinates; and (3) bank regulations, such as capital adequacy (CAD) requirements, reduce the absolute amount of incentive pay granted to executives.     

Deposit market competition,wholesale funding,and bank risk

Empirical research on the effect of bank competition on bank risk has so far produced very inconclusive results. In this paper we revisit this long-standing debate and propose a new empirical approach that is concentrated on the relationship between deposit market competition and bank risk. This approach closely follows the traditional theoretical views of the competition and risk relationship and is focused on testing the classical moral hazard problem of the bank: deposit market competition raises the optimal risk choice of the bank by raising the costs of bank liabilities. Since banks can substitute between retail and wholesale funding, we relate deposit market competition to wholesale market conditions and examine their joint effect on the risk of bank assets. The analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset, which combines retail deposit rate data with data on bank characteristics and data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 US banks. Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition.     

Mean–variance and mean–semivariance portfolio selection: a multivariate nonparametric approach

While univariate nonparametric estimation methods have been developed for estimating returns in mean-downside risk portfolio optimization, the problem of handling possible cross-correlations in a vector of asset returns has not been addressed in portfolio selection. We present a novel multivariate nonparametric portfolio optimization procedure using kernel-based estimators of the conditional mean and the conditional median. The method accounts for the covariance structure information from the full set of returns. We also provide two computational algorithms to implement the estimators. Via the analysis of 24 French stock market returns, we evaluate the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of both portfolio selection algorithms against optimal portfolios selected by classical and univariate nonparametric methods for three highly different time periods and different levels of expected return. By allowing for cross-correlations among returns, our results suggest that the proposed multivariate nonparametric method is a useful extension of standard univariate nonparametric portfolio selection approaches.     

Tax competition and the international distribution of firm ownership: an invariance result

How does the international distribution of firm ownership affect the outcomes of tax/subsidy competition for mobile plants? As corporate ownership becomes increasingly globalised, this question becomes increasingly important for policy. We prove a strong invariance result in the context of the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries for a monopoly firm’s plant. Both the equilibrium plant location and the equilibrium tax/subsidy offers are independent of the international distribution of the firm’s ownership. The reason is that the tax/subsidy competition equalises the firm’s post-tax profits across countries, making owners of capital indifferent towards the location of production.