Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region–specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within–region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non–monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.     

Monitoring technical change and employment

In October 1981 the UK Manpower Services Commission approached the Technology Policy Unit of the University of Aston with the idea of establishing a ‘technology monitor’ to research into the introduction of new technology and its implications on employment and skills. The monitor was to look at specific short-term changes (over five to ten years) in employment levels and patterns that would be of relevance to policy makers in the manpower field. The author, who has led this research, describes the setting up of the monitor, its major aims and possible future developments.     

分行营业网点服务状况调查与思考

分行的网点服务状况,能充分体现一家银行的经营水平和管理能力。本文记述了一次分行网点服务状况的实地调研,作者从业务拓展和赢得客户的角度,通过对比分析,揭示了该行网点服务的一些不足之处,并提出了相应的改进措施。     

Teamwork: a case study on development and performance

The most popular model of team development in Dutch socio-technical literature is a linear approach, which states that teams develop in four successive phases. A method for defining the particular phase a team is in was developed a number of years ago and was recently used in a large-scale survey at Volvo's cab manufacturing plant in Umeå (northern Sweden). Thirty-seven semi-autonomous teams were studied at this plant during a seven-month period. This paper examines the development of the teams and addresses the effects of team development on overall team performance. The aspect of team development was correlated to both performance in terms of quality of working life (QWL) and business performance (BP), which is an empirically unexplored field within team literature. The linear phase approach of team development could not be proved. Nevertheless, teams were found to develop in four important areas, with each aspect significantly affecting team performance.     

A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion

In this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a second‐degree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second‐degree price discrimination and from a third‐degree price discrimination and high willingness‐to‐pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability.