Greenhouse gas emissions trading in the European Union — Background and implementation of a “new” climate policy instrument

Conclusions  The EU ETS is a grandiose experiment that could pave the way for the EU becoming a pioneer in market mechanisms to counter global change. The speed of its implementation has surprised seasoned observers of Brussels decision processes. However, a timid approach to the national allocation of allowances could reduce the credibility of the instrument and prevent learning that will be crucial for later, deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, it will reduce the private sector acquisition of emission credits from the CDM which is necessary to embark on a global strategy for emissions reduction. A short-term bow to powerful interest groups from sunset industries risks shutting off the way forward for the sunrise industries that will grow on mitigating global climate change.     

Channeloptimierung bei der Bearbeitung ausländischer märkte: Case study der lapp- gruppe am beispiel USA

Viele Industrieunternehmen erwirtschaften heute einen gro?en Teil ihres Gesch?ftes in ausl?ndischen M?rkten. H?ufig wurde dieses Auslandsgesch?ft unternehmerisch und intuitiv aufgebaut und war dennoch in weniger wettbewerbsintensiven Zeiten erfolgreich. Heute sto?en diese gewachsenen Systeme an ihre Grenzen und sollten kritisch überdacht und professionalisiert werden. Der Beitrag gibt Hinweise zur systematischen Channeloptimierung anhand des Fallbeispiels der deutschen Lapp-Gruppe. Im Fokus steht dabei eine kritische Analyse der gegenw?rtigen Marktbearbeitung in den USA und der Entwurf eines neuen Channeldesigns für die Zukunft.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.